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ABSTRACT
As the descent from the heights of our most recent rights revolu-
tion continues apace, there is a cautionary lesson contained in the
aftermath of the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment and the
abolition of chattel slavery, 150 years ago this year. Reconstruction
was the moment when the promise of universal liberty to work first
became part of the American state’s covenant with its people. But
this promise was quickly lost, and the rights that the federal govern-
ment had extended to the freed slaves – the freedmen – were con-
tested and eventually nullified by vehement opposition in the
working fields and cities of the South. In this sense, workers’ rights
were the original civil rights, and the Freedmen’s Bureau, the origi-
nal federal labor rights agency, was a founding failure of enforce-
ment. This article argues that enforcement efforts today must take
from this history an increased focus on the labor standards of low-
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wage workers, in particular the unauthorized immigrants among
them. The presence of a largely unauthorized workforce in a labor
market, such as in day labor and domestic work, is a reliable sign
that the most vulnerable workers may be found there. By focusing
on these most vulnerable workers, government enforcement efforts
can help overcome the collective action problem that is created by
any system of minimum labor standards. The exploitation of vul-
nerable workers is the common behavior that has persisted
through the centuries, and while some of its premises may have
shifted, it remains the very wrong that our equal rights at work
were originally designed to combat.
INTRODUCTION
The origins of the rights enjoyed by today’s workers lie nearly
one hundred and fifty years ago, in Reconstruction, the war after
the Civil War.1 The United States passed the first laws requiring the
equal treatment of black Americans during Reconstruction, laying
the groundwork for the universal rights guarantees of the twenti-
eth century.2 But the federal government’s failure to enforce these
laws helped to nullify the promise of equality that was made by the
abolition of slavery, and usher in a long dark period for workers’
rights in the United States. Today, the descendants of these pio-
neering civil rights laws find their highest purpose when used to
once again protect the workers most vulnerable to exploitation by
modern economic actors: unauthorized immigrants, the laboring
portion of the American shadow economy.3
This article argues that an important lesson of Reconstruction
1 See, e.g., Reconstruction: The Second Civil War, (PBS television broadcast 2004).
2 See KATE MASUR, AN EXAMPLE FOR ALL THE LAND: EMANCIPATION AND THE STRUG-
GLE OVER EQUALITY IN WASHINGTON, D.C. 6 (2010) (“Even before the war, theories of
individual rights and contract were replacing local traditions that stressed standing
and collectivity. The rise of the Republican vision of free labor ideology, the Union
victory, and the raft of federal legislation and constitutional amendments that fol-
lowed the war all magnified this trend. Indeed, it is a commonplace that postwar legal
changes at the federal level laid the groundwork for the modern state and for a new
vision of individual rights.”).
3 See MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MOD-
ERN AMERICA 2 (2004) (“Employed in western and southwestern agriculture during
the middle decades of the twentieth century, today illegal immigrants work in every
region of the United States, and not only as farmworkers. They also work in poultry
factories, in the kitchens of restaurants, on urban and suburban construction crews,
and in the homes of middle-class Americans. Marginalized by their position in the
lower strata of the workforce and even more so by their exclusion from the polity,
illegal aliens might be understood as a caste, unambiguously situated outside the
boundaries of formal membership and social legitimacy.”).
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should be that, if the government is going to set a lower boundary
of labor standards that apply to all, it has to be prepared to police
that boundary, lest it become too porous and thereby allow too
many to fall through into the world of unregulated employment
below.4 The low-wage workforce of unauthorized immigrants is
hugely consequential to American household prosperity and the
nation’s macroeconomic strength.5 As the workplace rights of to-
day, granted to us in prior generations, continue to wane, whether
these rights can be asserted by the most vulnerable workers will
similarly have consequences for all.
The labor rights of unauthorized immigrants come up for dis-
cussion with some regularity in Congress,6 predictably as a fraught
topic that precludes much compromise.7 The polarized nature of
the debate draws moral outrage away from the vulnerability of un-
authorized workers in low-wage work, although that fact is increas-
ingly being documented. A recent landmark study by the National
Employment Law Project (NELP) found that more than two-thirds
of low-wage workers surveyed had experienced at least one pay-re-
lated violation in the work week prior to the survey.8 The study
4 See RUBEN J. GARCIA, MARGINAL WORKERS: HOW LEGAL FAULT LINES DIVIDE WORK-
ERS AND LEAVE THEM WITHOUT PROTECTION 4 (2012) (“Workplace law is seen as a
political battlefield between labor and capital, with each successive political change
leading the pendulum either more toward the laissez-faire or toward New Deal-style
regulation. This political see-saw has created a class of ‘marginal workers’—workers
who fall through the margins of different bodies of law that are supposed to protect
them, but lack the political power to fix the holes in the legislation. These pendulum
swings have produced a statutory framework that has left numerous gaps and incom-
plete protections for all workers.”).
5 See MARK S. KRIKORIAN, THE NEW CASE AGAINST IMMIGRATION: BOTH LEGAL AND
ILLEGAL 133 (2008) (“[W]hile immigration certainly increases the overall size of our
economy, it subverts the widely shared economic goals of a modern society: a large
middle class open to all, working in high-wage, knowledge-intensive, and capital-in-
tensive jobs exhibiting growing labor productivity and avoiding too skewed a distribu-
tion of income.”).
6 See, e.g., Ashley R. Parker & Steven Greenhouse, Labor and Business Reach Deal on
Immigration Issue, N.Y.TIMES, Mar. 30, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/03/31/us/politics/deal-said-to-be-reached-on-guest-worker-program-in-
immigration.html (describing an agreement “in principle on a guest worker program
for low-skilled, year-round temporary workers”).
7 ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG, A NATION BY DESIGN: IMMIGRATION POLICY IN THE FASHION-
ING OF AMERICA 23 (2008) (“Whereas policy regarding the ‘front gate’ is shaped by the
relatively free play of competing societal interests (political science’s traditional ‘plu-
ralism’), refugee policy is shaped by ‘realism’ (in which the state looms as a major
agent pursuing interests of its own), and ‘back-door’ policy comes close to fitting
classical ‘class-conflict’ theories.”).
8 ANNETTE BURNHART, ET AL., BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED WORKERS; VIOLATIONS
OF EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAWS IN AMERICA’S CITIES 27 (2009); available at http://
nelp.3cdn.net/e470538bfa5a7e7a46_2um6br7o3.pdf.
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found that the rate of wage violations for immigrant, and especially
unauthorized, workers in this group was up to more than twice as
high as for native-born workers.9 There is “widespread agreement
that unauthorized immigrants are vulnerable to abuse,” but more
work still to be done to measure the rate of violations.10 It is never-
theless clear that more should also be done to guard the rights of
those workers.11
In Part I of this article, I will begin by explaining how the per-
sistence of a working underclass that has difficulty accessing the
rights of the rest of the workforce has always been a feature of the
nation’s economy, rather than a bug. I will then argue for the im-
portance of labor standards enforcement in such a context, and
identify the sources of resistance that would accompany such ef-
forts. In Part II, I will describe how the regulatory failure of the
Freedmen’s Bureau helped kick off a long period of low worker
protection, embodied by the Supreme Court’s Lochner decision and
the still-ascendant doctrine of employment at-will, and provides a
cautionary example of why the rights of the most vulnerable work-
ers should be paramount for regulators. Finally, in Part III, I will
explain how this enforcement focus should apply to the modern
low-wage and unauthorized workforce, and attempt to respond to
the likely vehement opposition that advocacy for such a regulatory
focus would prompt.
I.
A. The Persistent American Underclass
The enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was the pinnacle
of the rights revolution of the twentieth century, and the begin-
ning of its end.12 The revolution had taken decades to unfold, be-
9 Id. at 42–43 (also noting that “foreign-born Latinos had an especially high mini-
mum wage violation rate of 35 percent, double the rate of U.S.-born Latinos and
nearly six times the rate of U.S.-born whites. And race plays a marked role among
U.S.-born respondents, where African-American workers had a violation rate three
times that of white workers.”).
10 DORIS MEISSNER ET AL., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: THE
RISE OF A FORMIDABLE MACHINERY 89 (2013) (“While there is widespread agreement
that unauthorized immigrants are vulnerable to abuse, there is surprisingly little re-
search that systematically compares employers that violate labor standards with those
that violate employer verification (i.e. immigration) requirements.”).
11 Id. (“However, there is strong evidence that low-wage immigrants work at high
rates in particular industries and firms that substantially violate labor laws.”).
12 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULA-
TORY STATE, at V (1990) (“By the ‘rights revolution’ I mean the creation, by Congress
and the President, of a set of legal rights departing in significant ways from those
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ginning during the New Deal with the passage of worker-protection
laws such as the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), in 1938. No new
employment-rights statutes of significance have been enacted in
the half-century since the Civil Rights Act, apart from its amend-
ment and broadening in 1991, and, arguably, the Americans with
Disabilities Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, and ERISA.13
Specialized statutes governing occupational safety and unem-
ployment insurance remain important to the well-being of Ameri-
can workers, but they do not primarily regulate (some would say
intrude upon14) the employment contract. In the meantime, union
density under the system of labor relations established by the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (another New Deal-era statute) contin-
ues to erode, with all that entails. The inescapable conclusion is
that the rights enjoyed by workers in the modern American legal
system are far more likely to shrink than to expand in the future,15
and that there are no better ones on offer.
It becomes all the more crucial, then, that efforts to enforce
these rights be targeted towards the most vulnerable in the Ameri-
can workforce, whether that vulnerability is the result of the opera-
tion of other federal laws (such as in the case of unauthorized
immigrants),16 the operation of a particular economic sector (such
as in agriculture and meatpacking),17 expressions of bigotry, or a
recognized at the time of the framing of the American Constitution. The catalogue is
a long one, but the most prominent examples include rights to . . . freedom from
public and private discrimination on the basis of race, sex, disability, and age. The
rights revolution was presaged by the New Deal and by President Roosevelt’s explicit
proposal of a Second Bill of Rights in 1944; it culminated, at least thus far, in the
extraordinary explosion of statutory rights in the 1960s and 1970s.”).
13 GARCIA, supra note 4, at 66 (“Besides the Americans with Disabilities Act passed
in 1990 to cover disability discrimination, no new categories of protection had been
added to Title VII since its passage in 1964, until the Genetic Nondiscrimination Act
of 2008.”).
14 See, e.g., WALTER K. OLSON, THE EXCUSE FACTORY: HOW EMPLOYMENT LAW IS PAR-
ALYZING THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 308 (1997) (“The new employment law makes
scarcely a single promise that it does not break. It promises a fairer sharing of the
blessings and burdens of work, but doles out its rewards capriciously, giving most to
those who already are doing the best.”).
15 See, e.g., Vance v. Ball State Univ., No. 11-556, slip op (U.S. Sup. Ct. Jun. 24,
2013) (narrowing the definition of “supervisor” for the purposes of employer liability
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act).
16 Maria Ontiveros, Immigrant Rights and the Thirteenth Amendment, 16(2) NEW LA-
BOR FORUM, 26, 28 (2007) (“From a Thirteenth Amendment perspective, Hoffman
[Plastic] creates a caste of workers, primarily people of color, whose status is beneath
that established for free labor.”).
17 See ERIC SCHLOSSER, FAST FOOD NATION: THE DARK SIDE OF THE ALL-AMERICAN
MEAL 149–150 (2001) (“Migrant workers have long played an important role in the
agricultural economy of other states, picking berries in Oregon, apples in Washing-
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combination of multiple such factors.18
It is widely agreed-upon that unremedied violations of univer-
sal labor standards occur more frequently at the lower, rather than
the middle or higher, end of income.19 Accordingly, any agent
whose mission is the eradication of such violations should go where
they most occur. For unauthorized immigrants, the real or per-
ceived absence of impartial outside assistance when they are
wronged20 helps ensure that such workers are looked to first by
employers when economic forces encourage their exploitation, as
such forces have always done.21
The low-wage workforce is also vulnerable because the incen-
tive to commit wage violations for a given employer in any particu-
lar employment situation can rise as the amount of money at issue
declines. This may seem counterintuitive—surely an employer has
a higher incentive to fail to pay wages when the amount to be
gained is higher. The additional variable that changes this calcula-
tion is the likelihood of dispute, and this is where employment laws
play their role. In the case of wages, employers are able to routinely
“nickel and dime” their low-wage workers out of amounts that read-
ers of this article (and lawyers generally) would consider small. The
employers can do this because, on average, the money will be too
little to justify enforcement efforts by the employee or anyone
else.22 At the same time, these wages are meaningful portions of
ton, and tomatoes in Florida. Today, the United States, for the first time in its history,
has begun to rely on a migrant industrial workforce. Thousands of new migrants now
travel north to work in the slaughterhouses and meat processing plants of the High
Plains . . . These migrants come mainly from Mexico, Guatemala, and El Salvador.
Many were once farm workers in California, where steady jobs in the fields are now
difficult to find. To farm workers who’ve labored outdoors, ten hours a day, for the
nation’s lowest wages, meatpacking jobs often sound too good to be true. Picking
strawberries in California pays about $5.50 an hour, while cutting meat in a Colorado
or Nebraska slaughterhouse can pay almost twice that amount. In many parts of rural
Mexico and Guatemala, workers earn about $5 a day.”).
18 See generally NGAI, supra note 3.
19 See BURNHART ET AL., supra note 8, at 2 (“Many employment and labor laws are
regularly and systematically violated, impacting a significant part of the low-wage la-
bor force in the nation’s largest cities.”).
20 See MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 10, at 84-87 (describing enforcement resources
of Wage & Hour Division of U.S. Department of Labor and information-sharing
agreements with Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency).
21 Cf. JAMES C. SCOTT, THE ART OF NOT BEING GOVERNED: AN ANARCHIST HISTORY
OF UPLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA 24 (2010) (“The concentration of people and production
at a single location required some form of unfree labor when population was sparse,
as it was in Southeast Asia. All Southeast Asian states were slaving states, without ex-
ception, some of them until well into the twentieth century.”).
22 See BARBARA EHRENREICH, NICKEL AND DIMED: ON (NOT) GETTING BY IN AMERICA
210 (2001) (“So if low-wage workers do not always behave in an economically rational
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each individual employee’s meager overall income, and meaning-
fully large enough to the employer in aggregate to justify continu-
ing the practice.23
Unauthorized workers in particular suffer this condition by
reason of a legal demarcation alone, ostensibly one to do with na-
tional sovereignty, and not primarily motivated by these workers’
roles in the labor market.24 Upon closer examination, it becomes
apparent that the labor aspect of immigration controls in Ameri-
can history was arguably the aspect that mattered most in the cen-
tury that followed Emancipation and the loss of the slave
workforce,25 and that it remains so today.
B. Exploitation as Feature, Not Bug
A system of labor regulation will only imperfectly cover the
working population to which it applies. Mostly, it is a question of
scale. The informal economies at the low end of global income,
such as what exists today in much of India,26 often dwarf the formal
economies that exist alongside them. In other instances, this im-
perfect coverage is by design.27 In the United States, founded upon
the principle of equality before law, formal law has been used
way, that is, as free agents within a capitalist democracy, it is because they dwell in a
place that is neither free nor in any way democratic. When you enter the low-wage
workplace—and many of the medium-wage workplaces as well—you check your civil
liberties at the door, leave America and all it supposedly stands for behind, and learn
to zip your lips for the duration of the shift.”).
23 See BURNHART, ET AL., supra note 8, at 5 (“The average worker lost $51, out of
average weekly earnings of $339. Assuming a full-time, full-year work schedule, we
estimate that these workers lost an average of $2,634 annually due to workplace viola-
tions, out of total earnings of $17,616. That translates into wage theft of 15 percent of
earnings.”).
24 See RICHARD B. LILLICH, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF ALIENS IN CONTEMPORARY INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 69 (1984) (“During the nineteenth century the phenomenon of mi-
grant labour was perceived as a blessing rather than as a problem. In the high days of
laissez-faire, with its ethos of free enterprise and ready movement of labour and capi-
tal, even the system of requiring travelers to carry passports with them fell into disuse.
The problems of migrant labour were simply problems of labour generally. This cen-
tury, however, has witnessed dramatic change, spurred in large part by World War I,
with its welter of restrictions and controls. It was then that the phenomenon of inter-
national migration for employment began to command attention as a problem in its
own right.”).
25 See, e.g., ZOLBERG, supra note 7, at 287.
26 See KATHERINE BOO, BEHIND THE BEAUTIFUL FOREVERS 6 (2012) (ethnographic
account of lives of slum dwellers in Mumbai, India, where “only six of the slum’s three
thousand residents had permanent jobs. (The rest, like 85 percent of Indian workers,
were part of the informal, unorganized economy.)”).
27 See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 213 (2004) (listing categories of
employees exempt from wage and hour standards of FLSA).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CNY\18-1\CNY103.txt unknown Seq: 8 12-MAY-15 13:16
54 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:47
throughout the nation’s history to maintain a sizable population to
whom normal worker protections do not apply. In the nineteenth
century, it was chattel slavery that fulfilled this function;28 in the
twentieth and twenty-first, it is the immigration system.
Before the passage of our modern workplace protections, the
rights of American workers had been defined by the sweeping civil
rights goals of Reconstruction,29 and their resounding defeat.30
The era that followed that defeat is embodied in the doctrine of
employment at will, which came into being in the decades after
Reconstruction.31 The turn of the twentieth century saw the Su-
preme Court hold in Lochner v. New York32 that the individual lib-
erty to contract that had been so central to Emancipation forbade
state regulation of working conditions. Lochner was of course over-
ruled to make way for the New Deal, but the doctrine of employ-
ment at will continues to predominate. Nevertheless, the modern
employment relationship is generally better than what an employer
might otherwise provide, given his druthers.33
Observing that the employment relationship in this country
was largely one of master-servant before Emancipation, and re-
mained so for much of the century following,34 does not diminish
28 See DAVID R. ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAKING OF THE
AMERICAN WORKING CLASS 25 (2007) (“The many gradations of unfreedom among
whites made it difficult to draw fast lines between any idealized free white worker and
a pitied or scorned servile Black worker. Indentured servitude [et al.] made for a
continuum of oppression among whites. Of course . . . that continuum did not extend
to the extreme of chattel slavery as was inflicted on people of color.”).
29 W.E.B. Du Bois described the mission of the Freedmen’s Bureau as “to settle the
Negro problems in the United States of America.” W. E. Burghardt Du Bois, The Freed-
men’s Bureau, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1901, Part One available at http://www.
theatlantic.com/past/docs/issues/01mar/dubois.htm; Part Two available at http://
www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/issues/01mar/dubois2.htm.
30 See David Blight, The Civil War and Reconstruction Era, 1845-1877 (On file with
Open Yale course HIST 119, lecture 24, at 5:45) (“80% of freedmen were sharecrop-
pers by as early as the late 1860’s.”).
31 James J. Brudney, Reluctance and Remorse: The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing in American Employment Law, 32 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 773, 798 (2010) (“As
is well known, American common law departed from its English roots when it devel-
oped the at-will rule in the late nineteenth century. The presumption that indefinite-
term hirings were terminable at the discretion of either party, that there was no mutu-
ality of obligation regarding job tenure in these contracts, coincided with the rise of
laissez-faire capitalism.”).
32 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
33 SATURDAY NIGHT LIVE: THE BEST OF CHRIS ROCK (NBC Home Video 1999) (The
comedian Chris Rock joked that the message a boss sends to a person who works for
minimum wage is: “If I could pay you less, I would.”).
34 See BARBARA YOUNG WELKE, LAW AND THE BORDERS OF BELONGING IN THE LONG
NINETEENTH CENTURY UNITED STATES 116 (2010) (“Bracketing the Civil War and Re-
construction as the end point of an era ignores the ugly continuities between slavery
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the gains that have been made. A focus on the poorest, most vul-
nerable workers in the economy today begins at a much better
place than it did during Reconstruction, when subsistence farming
was a state to which most freedmen aspired.35 The modern ex-
ploitation of vulnerable workers is the successor to the economic
behavior that our employment laws were first written to elimi-
nate,36 even though the overall conditions of these workers have
improved alongside everyone else.
This commonality between eras is illustrated by the fact that
we can find these workers in many of the same places they were
found 150 years ago—in farms and fields, kitchens and bathrooms.
The faces of most of the workers have changed. This does not im-
ply that black Americans have sufficiently overcome racism such
that they no longer have a need for the laws originally written to
benefit them, and those laws can now focus on another disadvan-
taged group. To the contrary, now more than ever, those laws are
still needed for that original purpose.37
But society no longer accepts the race of the worker as an ex-
press justification for exploitation. It may, however, accept his or
her immigration status.38 The common thread between the centu-
ries for the exploitation in question is that it happens to the most
and the stunted freedom enjoyed by the vast majority of African Americans in the
South by the century’s end.”).
35 AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR, MARRIAGE, AND
THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION 41 (1998) (“In the eyes of many
former slaves, land ownership represented the natural outcome of emancipation—a
bounty of war, a recompense for unrequited toil, an entitlement due by the labor
theory of property. As defined by Georgia freedmen, freedom did not mean substitut-
ing the impersonal discipline of wage contracts for slave masters’ personal dominion
but rather being independent and owning property other than the self: the right to
‘reap the fruit of our own labor,’ to ‘take care of ourselves,’ and to ‘have land, and
turn it and till it by our own labor.’”).
36 Ontiveros, supra note 16, at 27-28 (“This conception of free labor protects the
uniquely human rights of workers-rights which are inherently placed in danger when
labor becomes a commodity. The Supreme Court found that the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, at its core, stands for the proposition that human labor must be treated differ-
ently and given more respect and protection than other things which get bought and
sold via contracts. The Amendment protects workers rights as human rights.”).
37 See Brad Plumer, These Ten Charts Show the Black-White Economic Gap Hasn’t Budged
in 50 Years, WASH. POST BLOG, (Aug. 28, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/08/28/these-seven-charts-show-the-black-white-economic-
gap-hasnt-budged-in-50-years.
38 See DAVID WEIL, IMPROVING WORKPLACE CONDITIONS THROUGH STRATEGIC EN-
FORCEMENT, A REPORT TO THE WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION 20 (2010), available at http://
www.dol.gov/whd/resources/strategicEnforcement.pdf (including among “sources of
workforce vulnerability” the effect of “a large influx of immigrant (and in many cases
undocumented) workers, who are particularly vulnerable to exploitation . . . ”).
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vulnerable workers, and that there remain third parties empow-
ered to take action under laws written for that situation, and not
the reasons given.”39
To their credit, the federal workplace enforcement agencies
state plainly that they do not consider employee immigration status
in their enforcement efforts.40 But the lesson of Reconstruction, as
it approaches its sesquicentennial, is that this is not enough. To
fully effectuate equality before the law in the workplace, enforce-
ment agencies must explicitly commit to seeking out firms and in-
dustries employing unauthorized immigrants, as the U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) does,41 because
the labor standards that all US workers enjoy are best served when
they are enforced for these most vulnerable members of the work-
ing population.42 By the same token, when these standards are in-
evitably narrowed, it tends to hit this subset of workers hardest.43
39 See JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 867 (The
Oxford history of the United States, Vol. 6) (1988) (“Eternal vigilance against the
tyrannical power of government remains the price of our negative liberties, to be
sure. But it is equally true that the instruments of government power remain neces-
sary to defend the equal justice under law of positive liberty.”).
40 See Ming H. Chen, Where You Stand Depends on Where You Sit: Bureaucratic Politics
in Federal Workplace Agencies Serving Undocumented Workers, 33 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 227, 239–240 (2012) (“[The Hoffman Plastic decision] triggered a rapid response
from all three federal workplace agencies. Within months of Hoffman, the NLRB, the
DOL, and the EEOC promulgated policy statements, internal memoranda, and a vari-
ety of regulatory guidance on the interpretation and implementation of case law.
While none of these promulgations took the form of notice and comment rules and
not all carried the independent force of law, these documents memorialized the agen-
cies’ interpretation of existing law and indicated how they planned to exercise their
discretion. The defining characteristic of each guidance document was an agency in-
terpretation that blunted the Supreme Court’s opinion. While the specific exercise of
discretion varied across agencies, each agency read Hoffman narrowly, reaffirmed that
immigration status is not relevant to the labor and employment rights they protect,
and emphasized that the agency practice is not to inquire into immigration status in
the course of investigations.”).
41 The second priority listed in the agency’s most recent Strategic Enforcement
Plan is “Protecting immigrant, migrant and other vulnerable workers. The EEOC will
target disparate pay, job segregation, harassment, trafficking and discriminatory lan-
guage policies affecting these vulnerable workers who may be unaware of their rights
under the equal employment laws, or reluctant or unable to exercise them.” EEOC
STRATEGIC ENFORCEMENT PLAN FY 2013 - 2016, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/
eeoc/plan/sep.cfm.
42 See generally WEIL, supra note 38 (setting forth enforcement priorities and strate-
gies for Department of Labor to increase focus on violations against low-wage
workers).
43 See, e.g., Teresa Tritch, The Family Unfriendly Act, N.Y. TIMES BLOG (May 10, 2013,
9:00 PM) http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/05/10/the-family-unfriendly-
act/ (criticizing U.S. Congressional bill to allow “private-sector employers to offer
compensatory time off in lieu of time-and-a-half pay for overtime,” noting that “em-
ployees can use their comp time only at the employer’s convenience,” and that the
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The traditional conservative perspective on the individual free-
dom to contract sees employment laws such as antidiscrimination
statutes as overly intrusive,44 economically inefficient,45 or some
damning combination of the two.46 Another point of view, in-
formed by the history of Reconstruction and its aftermath, is that
protecting a particular worker’s freedom from an unlawful con-
tract is very much a protection of the basic right to contract for
all.47 The Abolitionists were among the first to raise equality in the
employment relationship to the prominence of the more tradition-
ally popular values of efficiency and utility.48
As discussed at greater length in Part II, the first new individ-
ual rights amendments to the Constitution since the original Bill of
Rights49 were a necessary step to ensure the legal status of the
only “recourse for coerced workers would be to sue, a far-fetched and unaffordable
option for most people”).
44 See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EM-
PLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 145-266 (1992).
45 See DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, ONLY ONE PLACE OF REDRESS: AFRICAN-AMERICANS, LA-
BOR REGULATIONS, AND THE COURTS FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE NEW DEAL 105
(2001) (“[T]he historical choice with regard to particular New Deal regulatory issues
was often between federal government regulation and unregulated labor markets. Be-
cause of their lack of political influence, for most of the period after Reconstruction
and before the modern civil rights era African Americans were better off with free
labor markets than with federal regulation.”).
46 See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 198 (1993)
(“[Discriminatory firms] will, over time, be driven from the market by non-discrimina-
tory firms which are prepared to lower their costs or increase their productivity
through the hiring of appropriately qualified blacks or increase their profits through
the servicing of black clientele - profits that firms with discriminatory proprietors are
denying to themselves. This argument is not so much that anti-discrimination laws are
inefficient as that they are unnecessary, and given that their administration entails
some costs, including error costs, these laws may simply impose a deadweight social
cost on the community” (citations omitted)).
47 See, e.g., CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, THE MARKET SYSTEM: WHAT IT IS, HOW IT WORKS,
AND WHAT TO MAKE OF IT 20 (2001) (including, among basic preconditions for mar-
ket system, that “coordination” is required  “to curb injuries that otherwise people
inflict on each other”); id. at 56 (“Market relations do not begin with exchanges of
performances and objects somehow ‘there’ to be exchanged. Market relations deter-
mine what is to be made or done—and brought to exchange.”).
48 Samuel R. Bagenstos, Employment Law and Social Equality, 112 MICH. L. REV. 225,
228-29 (2013) (“But outside of the antidiscrimination  precinct,  individual employ-
ment  law  does  not  protect  particular  classes  or  axes  of  identity.  Its protections
are, in an important sense, universal . . . When we explore the application of employ-
ment law outside of the discrimination context, we will find that concerns about social
equality—although not named as such—lie at the heart of the questions the doctrine
asks and answers.”).
49 SUNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 16-17 (“Perhaps the most important individual rights
provisions of the original Constitution were the contracts clause—exempting freedom
of contract from governmental interference—and the privileges and immunities
clause, which entitled citizens of each state to be free from protectionist interference
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freedmen as workers.50 Emancipation brought a great mass of new
workers into the light of full civil society,51 requiring the federal
government to make free labor its earliest enforcement priority.52
The United States was newly dedicated to the universal individual
rights for workers,53 because enslavement was formally the loss of
control over their own labor, by force as well as operation of law.54
Freedom at work thus became the template for individual freedom
as a whole.55
from the governments of other states. Moreover, the eminent domain clause, safe-
guarding private property, was a prominent part of the Bill of Rights, which has usu-
ally been thought, rightly, to find an organizing principle in the desire to prevent
collective interference with private ordering. In these respects, the original constitu-
tional rights were ‘negative’ in character—rights to be free from governmental intru-
sion, rather than rights to affirmative governmental assistance.”).
50 See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-
1877 at 244 (Henry Steele Commager & Richard B. Morris eds., 1988) (“In constitu-
tional terms, the Civil Rights bill represented the first attempt to give meaning to the
Thirteenth Amendment, to define in legislative terms the essence of freedom. Again
and again during the debate on Trumbull’s bills, Congressmen spoke of the national
government’s responsibility to protect the ‘fundamental rights’ of American citizens.
But as to the precise content of these rights, uncertainty prevailed.”).
51 See DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF
BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II 235 (2009) (“Human slaves
had been freed many times before—from the Israelites, to the Romans, to Africans in
the vast British Empire as recently as 1834. But no society in human history had at-
tempted to instantly transform a vast and entrenched slave class into immediate full
and equal citizenship. The cost of educating freed slaves and their children came to
seem unbearably enormous, even to their purported friends. Their expectations of
compensation radically altered the economics of southern agriculture. And even
among the most ardent abolitionists, few white Americans in any region were truly
prepared to accept black men and women, with their seemingly inexplicable dialects,
mannerisms, and supposedly narrow skills, as true social equals.”).
52 See ROBERT J. STEINFELD, THE INVENTION OF FREE LABOR: THE EMPLOYMENT RELA-
TION IN ENGLISH & AMERICAN LAW AND CULTURE, 1350-1870, at 181 (1991) (“Ulti-
mately, it was only as a result of the long ideological struggle that preceded the Civil
War and the war itself that the modern way of seeing peonage (and indentured servi-
tude) was finally consolidated and became the exclusive view of all forms of legally
compelled labor.”).
53 George Rutherglen, Constitutionalizing Employees’ Rights: Lessons from the History of
the Thirteenth Amendment, 27 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 162, 165 (2012) (“[The Thir-
teenth Amendment has] a more immediate connection to labor and employment
than [either the Fourteenth Amendment or the Commerce Clause] or, indeed, to any
other provision in the Constitution. It excludes altogether certain forms of the
master-servant relationship from among those allowed by American law.”).
54 STANLEY, supra note 35, at 55-56 (“Principles of contract rang through the halls
of Congress during the debate over the Civil Rights Act. The act asserted the principle
of equality before the law and the authority of the national government to guarantee
the irrevocable rights of citizens, which it enumerated as those of contract, property,
and personal liberty. But its immediate purpose was to nullify the Black Codes, and
the equal right of contract was the nub of the legislation.”).
55 See William E. Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement Upon Styles of Judicial
Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARV. L. REV. 513, 552, 554 (1974) (noting
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C. The Role of Labor Standards Enforcement
Today, individual equal rights at work remain vulnerable to
inadequacies in the enforcement process.56 It is impossible for
such rights to be enforced behind a “veil of ignorance” that allows
for equitable decision-making in all cases,57 and therefore enforce-
ment priorities must take into account existing inequities. Cass
Sunstein classifies the employment market as a “prisoner’s di-
lemma” or “collective action problem,” which arises when a “major-
ity of citizens might support regulation that would prevent them
from engaging in the very conduct which, in an unregulated sys-
tem, they are led to choose.”58
Sunstein explains that policies addressing a prisoner’s di-
lemma often take the form of “redistributive measures [that] do
not directly transfer resources to disadvantaged people or to those
whom we wish to subsidize, but instead attempt to deal with coordi-
nation or collective action problems faced by large groups.” In the
United States, this is the function of the private right of enforce-
ment for earnings, which is what American workers “get” from the
state in lieu of direct wealth transfers to the working poor.
Sunstein calls such a policy choice an “effort[ ] to overcome
the difficulties of organization of many people in the employment
market.”59 He contrasts this collective-action problem with the
“analogous problem” of  “coordination,” in which the government
arranges
private behavior in such a way as to satisfy private desires which,
if left to individual decision, would produce chaos or disorder.
Either a social norm or legal constraint is necessary to solve the
problem. Unlike in a prisoner’s dilemma, a coordination prob-
lem presents no incentive to defect once the solution is in place.
An agreement to solve a coordination problem is stable; an
that the “antislavery ideal of equality” before law “became commonplace in post-Civil
War judicial opinions,” particularly “in opinions dealing with enforcement of the Civil
War amendments and the federal legislation enacted pursuant thereto”).
56 SUNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 103 (“Statutes designed to reduce or eliminate the
social subordination of disadvantaged groups are frequently subject to skewed redis-
tribution and failure as a result of inadequate implementation. The very problems
that make such statutes necessary in the first instance tend to undermine enforce-
ment; market failure is matched by government failure.”).
57 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 211 (2009) (“[E]ven in a well-ordered
society the coercive powers of government are to some degree necessary for the stabil-
ity of social cooperation,” since “[b]y enforcing a public system of penalties govern-
ment removes the grounds for thinking that others are not complying with the rules.”
He called this “Hobbes’s thesis.”).
58 SUNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 51.
59 Id. at 55.
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agreement to solve a prisoner’s dilemma is not.60
The prisoner’s dilemma for employers is deciding whether to
exploit their employees amidst a background of declining labor
standards for employees in general,61 and changing economic con-
ditions, while employees must decide whether or not they will ac-
cept such behavior. In the language of economics, these employers
are not fully internalizing their actual labor costs. When the likeli-
hood of employees who are so treated challenging this behavior is
factored into the calculation, it becomes clear that the incentive to
defect for employers in any such employment transaction is high,
and vastly greater than the employees’. Sunstein’s point is that
such a situation is unstable and requires active intervention. That is
also the point of this article.
Regulations like the prohibition on unequal treatment in em-
ployment are best understood as limitations on “positional compe-
tition” between better- and worse-situated parties in a competitive
labor market. Employers who are willing to discriminate, pay below
minimum wage, or leave out overtime are given an advantage over
competitors who will not, and workers who will take such treatment
are similarly (dis)advantaged with respect to those who won’t.62
President Roosevelt, of course, made the expansion of individual
rights at work a touchstone of national policy in the New Deal, rec-
ognizing the importance of avoiding such a race to the bottom at a
time of mass economic deprivation.63
60 Id. at 51.
61 Katherine V.W. Stone, The Decline in the Standard Employment Contract: Evidence
from Ten Advanced Industrial Countries 33, UCLA SCHOOL OF LAW, Law-Econ Research
Paper No. 12-19, (2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstract_id=2181082 (“In the U.S. Japan, Canada, Australia, and many Euro-
pean countries, there has been a sizeable growth in several types of nonstandard
employment and a decline in job tenure for men in their mid-career years.”).
62 In making this point, the blogger Matthew Yglesias also described the labor mar-
ket as a collective action problem. See Matthew Yglesias, Labor Market Regulation and the
Freedom Red Herring, SLATE (July 4, 2012, 1:55 PM) http://www.slate.com/blogs/
moneybox/2012/07/04/labor_market_regulation_freedom_and_property_rights_
are_red_herrings.html (“[O]ftentimes I think we’re arguing about curbing positional
competition. You can easily imagine a workplace in which every worker would prefer
to work slightly shorter hours and would be willing to accept less pay, and where
managers would be willing to make that bargain. But the managers (naturally) look a
bit askance at whomever it is they deem to be the laziest worker, and the workers
(naturally) are therefore reluctant to present themselves as the laziest in the office.
Therefore nobody actually asks to make the hours/pay tradeoff. Group decision-
making, whether through a collective bargaining agreement or legislation, can create
a situation that most people are happier with.”).
63 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Commonwealth Club Address (Sept. 23, 1932), available
at www.teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=447.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CNY\18-1\CNY103.txt unknown Seq: 15 12-MAY-15 13:16
2014] A FOUNDING FAILURE OF ENFORCEMENT 61
The axiom “money paid for work done,” or some variant
thereof, underlies all wage law enforcement, public or private.64
The existence of wage laws is universally accepted, with their pa-
rameters often disputed,65 because those laws support the wide-
spread expectation of impartial state enforcement of bargaining
obligations freely made,66 which grows out of the precepts of basic
fairness learned by all in childhood.67 In this way, the enforcement
of wage laws is grounded in the exchange principle at the heart of
contracts: mutuality.68 Arguably this principle is even more central
to the operation of the employment contract than
nondiscrimination.69
The effective enforcement of agreed-upon individual worker
protections like wage laws70 can also help offset the existing tilt of
64 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FACT SHEET NO. 48: APPLICATION OF U.S. LABOR
LAWS TO IMMIGRANT WORKERS: EFFECT OF HOFFMAN PLASTIC DECISION ON LAWS EN-
FORCED BY THE WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION (2002), available at http://www.dol.gov/
whd/regs/compliance/whdfs48.htm (“[Enforcement of wage laws is] distinguishable
from ordering back pay under the NLRA. In Hoffman Plastics (sic), the NLRB sought
back pay for time an employee would have worked if he had not been illegally
discharged, under a law that permitted but did not require back pay as a remedy.
Under the FLSA or MSPA, the Department (or an employee) seeks back pay for
hours an employee has actually worked, under laws that require payment for such
work.” (emphasis in original)).
65 See, e.g., Ed Sealover, How wage-theft regulations bill became OK with Colorado busi-
nesses, DENVER BUSINESS JOURNAL, Apr.17, 2014, http://www.bizjournals.com/denver/
blog/capitol_business/2014/04/how-wage-theft-regulations-bill-became-ok-with.html
(lauding a successful modification to the state wage law “as a testament to what
business can do when it works with legislators to find compromise on an issue with a
seemingly unbridgeable divide”).
66 See TREBILCOCK, supra note 46, at 23 (“As Arrow has pointed out, a private prop-
erty-private exchange system depends, for its stability, on the system’s being non-uni-
versal. For example, if political, bureaucratic, regulatory, judicial, or law enforcement
offices were auctioned off to the highest bidder, or police officers, prosecutors, bu-
reaucrats, regulators, or judges could be freely bribed in individual cases, or votes
could be freely bought and sold, a system of private property and private exchange
would be massively destabilized.” (citing Kenneth Arrow, Gifts and Exchanges, 1 PHIL.
AND PUB. AFF. 343 (1972)).
67 See, e.g., EVE BUNTING, A DAY’S WORK (1997) (children’s book narrating an in-
stance of conflict between a Spanish-speaking day laborer and employer).
68 See BJÖRN BARTLING, ET AL., USE AND ABUSE OF AUTHORITY: A BEHAVIORAL FOUN-
DATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION 33 (2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=2175701 (“We find that the principals have an almost universal preference for
employment contracts –regardless of whether they are used in an efficient or an
inefficient way – while workers resist accepting employment contracts if a large
number of  principals use them to assign inefficient (abusive) tasks.”).
69 See LINDBLOM, supra note 47, at 4 (“This gives us a definition of the market
system sufficient for our immediate purposes: it is a system of society wide coordina-
tion of human activities not by central command but by mutual interactions in the
form of transactions.”).
70 Compare TIM JUDSON & CRISTINA FRANCISCO-MCGUIRE, WHERE THEFT IS LEGAL 4
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the law of employment in the United States,71 which by default fa-
vors the better-resourced initiator of the employment contract (the
employer) over the other party.72 This bias is so pervasive that the
question of whether the other party to an agreement to work is an
“employee,” so as to qualify for protection under most employment
laws, becomes a matter of central dispute in any instance of wages
going unpaid.73
Given these inequities, and the vast differences between the
stakes of individual employees and employers in a dispute,74 em-
ployees still largely require outside assistance to assert their rights
against an employer with other preferences. It was precisely this
type of good-faith assistance from others that was absent for so
many of the freedmen during Reconstruction,75 and that is often
(2012) (noting that California has only wage orders, not statutes, but ranks well com-
pared to other states because of the quality of their enforcement), and GREGORY D.
KUTZ & JONATHAN T. MEYER, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR: WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION’S COM-
PLAINT INTAKE AND INVESTIGATIVE PROCESSES LEAVE LOW-WAGE WORKERS VULNERABLE
TO WAGE THEFT, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-458T, (Mar. 25, 2009),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09458t.pdf (“WHD’s investigations were
frequently delayed by months or years, but once complaints were recorded in WHD’s
database and assigned as a case to an investigator, they were often adequately
investigated”).
71 See MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 10, at 84 (“Low-wage immigrants, particularly the
unauthorized, are highly concentrated in certain industries that have traditionally ex-
perienced substantial labor standards violations. In addition, some employers exploit
the fear of deportation to discourage unauthorized immigrants from reporting viola-
tions of law and protesting substandard conditions. Exploitation of unauthorized
workers by unscrupulous employers drives down wages and working conditions for all
workers, and gives such employers a competitive advantage.”).
72 See George Rutherglen, The Thirteenth Amendment, the Power of Congress, and the
Shifting Sources of Civil Rights Law, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1551, 1563 (“ [Civil rights and
economic rights], while never entirely coextensive, had solidified as the foundation
for the regime of freedom of contract—what we would call today formal equality of
opportunity. Everyone has the same legal rights to make contracts, hold property, and
go to court. No guarantee is offered to individuals of the resources to develop or
exercise these rights, which therefore differ drastically in value depending upon an
individual’s economic and social position.”).
73 See GARCIA, supra note 4, at 34 (“The misclassification of workers has become a
serious problem in the economy. A broader definition of worker is necessary. Recent
studies estimate that up to 30 percent of companies misclassify workers. Independent
contractors cannot organize or get the protection of labor laws.”).
74 Bagenstos, supra note 48, at 116, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2208883
(“Asymmetric vulnerability is a particular concern in employment markets—especially
in times of high unemployment. For an individual worker, having and keeping a job is
supremely important. For the employer, by contrast, individual employees are often
replaceable or even fungible.”).
75 CHARLES L. FLYNN, JR., WHITE LAND, BLACK LABOR: CASTE AND CLASS IN LATE
NINETEENTH-CENTURY GEORGIA 38 (1983) (relating incident in 1866 when “the head
of the Freedmen’s Bureau in Georgia . . . appointed agents from among the resident
white . . . to serve without salary” but instead “receive fees from employers and freed-
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not available for unauthorized immigrants working today.
D. Sources of Resistance to Equal Treatment for the Unauthorized
The national immigration laws have an attenuated relation-
ship (if any at all) to the actual levels of supply and demand for
workers in this country’s labor market.76 Nevertheless, they have
great influence on the availability and treatment of many of the
workers in that market.77 Significant portions of the American pop-
ulation believe that unauthorized immigrants are both unwelcome
and unneeded in the United States, and, extending this premise to
the enforcement of labor standards, they conclude that the unau-
thorized are ineligible for the same protection from unlawful work-
place practices that authorized workers enjoy.78
As discussed at greater length in Part III, this view, while wide-
spread, is ahistorical and ignores the degree to which workplace
injustice in modern production and service operations is fungi-
ble.79 For example, low-wage Latino workers with valid work status
may receive comparable treatment to the undocumented workers
alongside whom they work or compete for day laboring positions.80
men for the witnessing of contracts.” However, the “‘resident white appointees . . .
shamefully abused’ their power and ‘occasionally inflicted cruel and unusual punish-
ments,’ reported General Oliver O. Howard, and “the Georgia bureau returned to a
system of salaried, mostly northern agents in January, 1867.”).
76 ZOLBERG, supra note 7, at 14 (“While post-World War II policies constituted a
liberalization in relation to the extremely restrictionist regime established in the first
quarter of the century, the contemporary regime retains a ‘near-zero baseline’ with
regard to the supply of entries in relation to the demand for them as well as in rela-
tion to the size of the resident population-current annual U.S. immigration, for exam-
ple, amounts to approximately one-third of 1 percent.”).
77 See, e.g., Brian Bennett & Michael Memoli, Senators’ immigration talks stall, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 22, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/mar/22/nation/la-na-
immigration-unfinished-20130323 (noting that one of the difficulties in negotiation
was that “the two sides couldn’t agree whether foreign workers should be paid the
same wages as Americans.”).
78 See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002). See also
KRIKORIAN, supra note 5, at 1 (arguing that defects in the structure of the American
labor market require further restricting immigration into the United States).
79 As the libertarian blogger Will Wilkinson put it, “Appealing to fairness is a strat-
egy for bargaining over the division of the surplus, not a way of determining in ad-
vance the ‘correct’ division. Our discourse would be a lot less confused if everyone
grasped this.” Market forces and appeals to fairness, THE ECONOMIST (June 25, 2013, 2:26
PM), www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2013/06/economic-inequal
ity?fsrc=scn/tw_ec/market_forces_and_appeals_to_fairness.
80 See, e.g., BURNHART ET AL., supra note 8, at 14 (noting that “[c]onsistent with
recent trends in the low-wage labor market, immigrants comprise a large part of our
sample—30 percent of the sample was U.S.-born, with the remainder comprised of
naturalized citizens, and authorized and unauthorized immigrants [and 63% Latino/
a].”).
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The same process may cause entire industries to adopt lowest-com-
mon-denominator conditions, once native-born workers—who may
be perceived as more likely to dispute rights violations—no longer
predominate the workforce.81
The effects of the immigration system admittedly interact with
other social conditions today to apply a discount to the labor of the
working poor.82 But immigrants have the dubious distinction of be-
ing the de jure underclass that persisted in America after Emancipa-
tion.83 The first successful tests of the application of the universal
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment beyond black Ameri-
cans were brought before the Supreme Court by Chinese immi-
grant plaintiffs in the nineteenth century.84 The enslavement of
Chinese “coolies” became a topic of Congressional discussion al-
most immediately after the legislative efforts for abolition con-
cluded in full,85 and their labor was at least as important to the
81 See, e.g., Charlotte S. Alexander, Explaining Peripheral Labor: A Poultry Industry
Case Study, 33 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 353, 395 (2012) (“[T]hough peripheral work
may now be less transnational in reality, the perception of transnationalism can be
‘sticky.’ Peripheral jobs have become branded as ‘immigrant work,’ and the associated
stigma may repel local workers.”).
82 See, e.g., BURNHART ET AL., supra note 8, at 5 (“Women were significantly more
likely than men to experience minimum wage violations, and foreign-born workers
were nearly twice as likely as their U.S.-born counterparts to have a minimum wage
violation. The higher minimum wage violation rate for foreign-born respondents was
concentrated among women—especially women who are unauthorized immigrants.
Foreign-born Latino workers had the highest minimum wage violation rates of any
racial/ethnic group. But among U.S.-born workers, there were significant race differ-
ences: African-American workers had a violation rate triple that of their white coun-
terparts (who had by far the lowest violation rates in the sample).”).
83 See, e.g., NGAI, supra note 3, at 135 (describing the “economic structure of migra-
tory wage-labor,” wherein “[g]rowers wanted not only seasonal workers,” but also “a
labor surplus so they could obtain workers on demand, at low wages, and in plentiful
supply to pick their crops early and quickly.” This dynamic was “the ruin of Anglo
small farmers and sharecroppers,” who complained that the “‘farmers would be bet-
ter off here if we did not have so many Mexicans.’ Many farmers compared their
plight to that of small white farmers in the South ‘injured by the Negro slavery system
before the Civil War.’”).
84 National citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment was upheld by the Su-
preme Court in U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898). Equal protection was
upheld much earlier, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
85 See Moon-Ho Jung, Outlawing “Coolies”: Race, Nation, and Empire in the Age of
Emancipation, 57 AM. Q. 677, 678 (2005) (“These congressional debates remind us of
the extent to which slavery continued to define American culture and politics after
emancipation. The language of abolition infused the proceedings on Chinese exclu-
sion, with no legislator challenging the federal government’s legal or moral authority
to forbid ‘coolies’ from entering the reunited, free nation. Indeed, by the 1880s,
alongside the prostitute, there was no more potent symbol of chattel slavery’s endur-
ing legacy than the ‘coolie,’ a racialized and racializing figure that anti-Chinese (and
putatively pro-Chinese) lawmakers condemned.”).
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economy of the West in the years after the Civil War as black labor
was to the South.86
It is nevertheless outrageous to many that unauthorized work-
ers should even be the subject of modern enforcement efforts, let
alone a priority. In other words, “money paid for time worked” is
no longer axiomatic when the work is done by someone who has
snuck into the country, “cut in line,” or otherwise violated national
immigration regulations. As one conservative columnist argued (al-
beit not in the context of employment), “It’s not a ‘crisis’ when
people who shouldn’t be here anyway don’t have all the privileges
of people who do have a right to be here. That’s how it should
be.”87 Under this view, such individuals simply do not deserve the
attention.
The question of what courts and enforcement agencies could
or should do for unauthorized-immigrant workers flared into prom-
inence in 2002, when the Supreme Court weighed in on the debate
with its decision in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB.88 The
Court in Hoffman Plastic foreclosed the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) from awarding back pay to an unauthorized-immi-
grant worker who had been terminated for supporting union or-
ganizing, for the reason that he “was never lawfully entitled to be
present or employed in the United States.”89 The majority opinion,
authored by then-Chief Justice Rehnquist, found that “awarding
backpay to illegal aliens runs counter to policies underlying” the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA),90 and
“would encourage the successful evasion of apprehension by immi-
gration authorities, condone prior violations of the immigration
laws, and encourage future violations.”91
Hoffman Plastic’s precedential effect was limited to the reme-
dial powers of the NLRB, but its implications seemed vast, espe-
cially at first, when it became the citation of choice for every
employer seeking to make a plaintiff’s immigration status an issue
86 See ZOLBERG, supra note 7, at 182 (“Within California, as of the early 1870s, the
Chinese constituted only about 9 percent of the total population; but since nearly all
of them were adult males, they amounted to one-fifth of the economically active and
probably one-fourth of all wage workers.”).
87 Kurt Schlichter, The Immigration “Crisis” Is No Crisis, TOWNHALL (June 13, 2013),
http://townhall.com/columnists/kurtschlichter/2013/06/13/the-immigration-crisis-
no-crisis-n1618034.
88 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
89 Id. at 146.
90 Id. at 149.
91 Id. at 150.
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in his or her case.92 These efforts were largely rebuffed on the mer-
its by the courts that entertained them.93 The Hoffman decision also
“triggered a rapid response from all three federal workplace agen-
cies” to reaffirm their position that immigration status was neither
relevant nor inquired into for their enforcement efforts.94
Ming Chen has concluded, from her own study of the enforce-
ment efforts made by these three agencies, the United States Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the National La-
bor Relations Board (NLRB), and the United States Department of
Labor (DOL), that they appear to be putting forward their best
efforts on behalf of unauthorized immigrants in the wake of the
Hoffman Plastic decision, taking into account the significant legal
and political constraints on their behavior.95 There is likely more
variety among the states that variously regulate their respective la-
bor markets, but only limited data exists on this question.96
Separate from the scope of the ruling, the logic of Hoffman
Plastic illustrates once again that the law-breaking nature of unau-
thorized immigrants is central to the arguments against those im-
migrants’ working rights. Yet the manner in which a particular
worker may have violated immigration regulations in the past does
not meaningfully guide a present decision whether to prioritize
such a worker’s claim for wages owed, in comparison to the claim
of an authorized worker, since both types nevertheless participate
in the same national economy.97 What can provide guidance in this
92 See, e.g., Christine N. Cimini, Ask, Don’t Tell: Ethical Issues Surrounding Undocu-
mented Workers’ Status in Employment Litigation, 61 STAN. L. REV. 355, 360 (2008) (“In
the wake of Hoffman, employers have attempted to broaden the Court’s holding by
arguing that immigration status is relevant to a whole range of employment-related
civil litigation.”).
93 See id. at 357 (“Since the Hoffman decision, lower courts have struggled to define
the parameters of the case, and, while the jurisprudence is still evolving, many courts
have limited Hoffman’s reach and found workers entitled to seek legal remedies for
workplace violations under a variety of statutes.”).
94 Chen, supra note 40, at 239.
95 Chen, supra note 40, at 230-231 (describing “three case studies” of the NLRB,
DOL, and EEOC that illustrated “a pattern of regulatory resistance to hostile immi-
grants’ rights laws. Characterizing these agency responses as reconfiguring, buffering,
and mitigating respectively, the Article contends that federal workplace agencies use
discretion to issue guidance that counters the contraction of immigrants’ rights in
courts. Counterintuitively for immigration scholars, the Article attributes these acts of
regulatory resistance to a professional ethos of protecting workers and to a commit-
ment to enforcing labor laws independent of the policy preferences of the civil ser-
vants and political leadership.”).
96 See, e.g., EUNICE HYUNHYE CHO, ET AL., HOLLOW VICTORIES: THE CRISIS IN COL-
LECTING UNPAID WAGES FOR CALIFORNIA’S WORKERS (2013) (NELP study comparing
wage collection efforts in California and Wisconsin).
97 See, e.g., Ramesh Ponnuru, New Immigration Bill Has One Terrible Flaw, BLOOM-
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decision are the lessons learned from the first time the nation ex-
perienced such an influx of workers into its wage economy, in the
wake of slavery’s abolition.
II.
A. Workers’ Rights as the Original Civil Rights
The common ancestor of all modern employment-rights laws
in the United States is the Civil Rights Act of 1866,98 the first equal
rights statute in American history.99 This original Civil Rights Act
(more would follow) was Congress’s first use of its newfound power
to write legislation under Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment,
to carry out the guarantee of slavery’s abolition contained in Sec-
tion 1 of the Amendment.100
The principle of equality was central to abolition because
American slavery rested on a belief in the inferiority of black Afri-
cans as a whole, and the enslaved among them specifically. This
entrenched racism continued to drive behavior even after slavery
itself was forbidden, of course, thus making the enforcement of
“equality before the law” the primary mission of the federal agents
charged with helping freed slaves integrate into the post-Emancipa-
tion American economy.
The Thirteenth Amendment was passed by Congress before
the end of military operations in the Civil War, but not ratified by
enough states to be enacted until December 1865,101 after Recon-
struction had already begun in the smoking and ruined South.102
BERG VIEW (Apr. 22, 2013, 6:00 PM), available at www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-
22/new-immigration-bill-has-one-terrible-flaw.html (“One of the worst things about
illegal immigration is that it creates a class of people who contribute their labor to this
country but aren’t full participants in it and lack the rights and responsibilities of
everyone else.”).
98 But see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOY-
MENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 135 (1992) (arguing that “the modern Civil Rights acts
[are] patterned on the 1875 statute [overturned in the Civil Rights Cases] and not the
earlier 1866 one”).
99 Ontiveros, supra note 16, at 27 (“By ending slavery, it sought to help the slaves
and improve society by eliminating certain types of evils, which we currently think of
as human rights or civil right violations, such as the selling of human beings, forced
labor, lack of family autonomy, and racial inequality.”).
100 MICHAEL VORENBERG, FINAL FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR, THE ABOLITION OF SLAV-
ERY, AND THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 50 (2001) (“[W]hen the Thirteenth Amend-
ment was ratified in December 1865, the enforcement legislation that congressmen
had in mind when they proposed the measure was nowhere to be found, and enforce-
ment would have to await the Civil Rights Act of 1866.”).
101 Id. at 233.
102 MCPHERSON, supra note 39, at 818 (“[B]y war’s end much of the South was an
economic desert. The war not only killed one-quarter of the Confederacy’s white men
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This period of American history is understood by all today as a fail-
ure on its own terms, such that by a half-century after the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, many of the ostensibly-free black American
working population labored in no better conditions than their fa-
thers and mothers had in the antebellum (pre-Civil War) era.103
Today, a half-century after our own most recent rights revolu-
tion, even if low-wage workers have made only meager material
gains in the elapsed time,104 at least that compares favorably to the
dismal slide that began in Reconstruction, continued through the
stark inequalities of the Gilded Age, and reached full flower during
“the long era of Jim Crow in the twentieth century.”105 It was only
through the Great Migration to northern and western cities like
New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles, which began during the First
World War and did not conclude until after the civil rights move-
ment, that the conditions of large numbers of black Americans be-
gan to improve.106
The reasons for Reconstruction’s failure are many, predomi-
nant among them the fierce pushback that came from the reac-
tionary South to the granting of equal rights to the newly-freed
slaves. The so-called Redemption of state and local governments in
the 1870s, and widespread vigilantism that gave birth to organiza-
of military age. It also killed two-fifths of southern livestock, wrecked half of the farm
machinery, ruined thousands of miles of railroad, left scores of thousands of farms
and plantations in weeds and disrepair, and destroyed the principal labor system on
which southern productivity had been based. Two-thirds of assessed southern wealth
vanished in the war. The wreckage of the southern economy caused the 1860s to
become the decade of least economic growth in American history before the 1930s.”).
103 See BLACKMON, supra note 51, at 234 (2009) (“Across the nation, the spring and
summer of 1903 marked a venomous turn in relations between blacks and whites. A
pall was descending on black America, like nothing experienced since the darkest
hours of antebellum slavery.”).
104 But see U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Employment, Benefits, and Wages, 14, available at www.
dol.gov/dol/aboutdol/history/herman/reports/futurework/report/chapter2/
main.htm (“Since the end of World War II, real wages for production workers have
risen by more than half. Most of this growth occurred, however, in the 1950s and
1960s. (See chart 2.1.) After reaching a peak in 1973, real hourly earnings for
production workers either fell or stagnated for two decades. During 1996–1998,
growth in hourly earnings resumed, accelerating to over two percent in 1998.”).
105 BLACKMON, supra note 51, at 86.
106 See ISABEL WILKERSON, THE WARMTH OF OTHER SUNS: THE EPIC STORY OF
AMERICA’S GREAT MIGRATION 9 (2010) (“Over the course of six decades, some six mil-
lion black southerners left the land of their forefathers and fanned out across the
country for an uncertain existence in nearly every other corner of America. The Great
Migration would become a turning point in history. It would transform urban
America and recast the social and political order of every city it touched. It would
force the South to search its soul and finally to lay aside a feudal caste system. It grew
out of the unmet promises made after the Civil War and, through the sheer weight of
it, helped push the country toward the civil rights revolutions of the 1960s.”).
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tions like the Ku Klux Klan, were the means by which the defeated
South wrested back control.107 This counter-revolution was the be-
ginning of the nullification of Emancipation’s guarantees in the
ninety-eight years that passed between the two Civil Rights Acts.108
Another prominent reason for the denial of the Thirteenth
(and, eventually, the Fourteenth) Amendment’s promise of “equal-
ity before the law” was the failure of the United States government
to enforce this equality on behalf of the people it was intended to
protect. The Freedmen’s Bureau, the federal agency created to en-
force that equality in the working fields and cities of the South dur-
ing the crucial years immediately after the War, was not equal to
the forces it was required to overcome to fulfill its mission.109
Once the issue of labor by coercion had been formally dealt
with by the Thirteenth Amendment, the focus of Republican
lawmakers in Congress rightfully turned from freedom to con-
tract,110 as enshrined in the Civil Rights Act, to freedom from unlaw-
ful contracts.111 This meant more than simply a prohibition on
work without pay, a baseline requirement for a nation in which the
107 BLACKMON, supra note 51, at 157 (“Investigations of any kind by federal agencies
were extraordinarily unusual in an era that predated the creation of the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation. Moreover, the South’s long asserted right to manage the affairs
of black residents without northern interference had finally been achieved. Nearly
every southern state, including Alabama, had completed the total disenfranchisement
of African Americans by 1901. Virtually no blacks served on state juries. No blacks in
the South were permitted to hold meaningful state or local political offices. There
were virtually no black sheriffs, constables, or police officers. Blacks had been wholly
shunted into their own inferior railroad cars, restrooms, restaurants, neighborhoods,
and schools. All of this had been accomplished in a sudden, unfettered grab by white
supremacists that was met outside the South with little more than quiet assent. During
the thirty years since Reconstruction—despite its being a period of nearly continuous
Republican control of the White House—federal officials raised only the faintest con-
cerns about white abuse of black laborers.”).
108 Id. at 42 (“The role of the African American in American society would not be
clear for another one hundred years.”).
109 See id. at 262 (“Just as the federal Freedmen’s Bureau agents sent into remote
southern towns had learned immediately after the Civil War, the new representatives
of northern justice brought more risk upon themselves than to any person still hold-
ing slaves.”).
110 See William E. Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement Upon Styles of Judicial
Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARV. L. REV. 513, 532 (1974)
(“[E]conomic rights of property and contract probably ranked next to the right of
personal liberty as the most important rights of which slaves were deprived” in aboli-
tionist rhetoric).
111 This was not an unforeseen turn. See ERIC FONER, THE FIERY TRIAL: ABRAHAM
LINCOLN AND AMERICAN SLAVERY 276 (2010) (quoting Lincoln in April 1864, “We all
declare for liberty; but in using the same word we do not all mean the same thing.
With some the word liberty may mean for each man to do as he pleases with himself,
and the product of his labor; while with others the same word may mean for some
men to do as they please with other men, and the product of other men’s labor.”).
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embodiment of individual freedom going forward would be wage
labor.112 Individual liberty fully defined brought with it a broader
set of expectations of fair treatment and non-discrimination,113 en-
shrined in the Fourteenth Amendment and its doomed legislative
progeny. The historian Kate Masur has described this as the differ-
ence between liberty and equality, two terms used to describe free-
dom in the era that required quite different levels of commitment
from the government to carry out.114
The national government’s newfound commitment to these
individual rights was tested and found wanting in many different
spheres. There were early struggles in Congress,115 and ultimately
all was lost before the Supreme Court.116 Between these two events,
the government’s commitment to freed slaves’ working rights
found itself most sorely tested in the ruins of the defeated South,
through the actions (and inaction) of the regulators created by
Congress to guard these rights and enforce these new laws.117 The
first of these agencies was the Freedmen’s Bureau.118
112 See ROBERT J. STEINFELD, COERCION, CONTRACT, AND FREE LABOR IN THE NINE-
TEENTH CENTURY 10 (2001) (“The origins of modern free wage labor are not to be
found in the free contracts in free markets of the first half of the nineteenth century
but in the restrictions placed on freedom of contract by the social and economic
legislation adopted during the final quarter of the century.”).
113 See George Rutherglen, The Thirteenth Amendment, the Power of Congress, and the
Shifting Sources of Civil Rights Law, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1551, 1552 (2012) (“Although
its full effect was not achieved for nearly a century, [the Thirteenth Amendment]
began the process of dismantling involuntary servitude as a widespread form of labor
relations. It was the first constitutional amendment to restrict state power and the first
to establish equality as an ideal in American life.”).
114 MASUR, supra note 2, at 4 (“Whereas the concept of freedom almost always im-
plied liberty—or people’s ability to act as they chose, unconstrained by government
or by other private persons—the concept of equality had everything to do with policy.
When people demanded equal rights, they were in essence asking for government
measures that would ensure that individuals who were in some ways unequal would be
treated equally or offered equal opportunities.”).
115 See FONER, RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 50, at 247-251 (describing how Con-
gress was required in April 1866, “for the first time in American history,” to “enact[ ] a
major piece of legislation over a President’s veto”—the Civil Rights Bill. Congress had
earlier in the year been forced to do the same when Andrew Johnson vetoed the
Freedmen’s Bureau Bill.).
116 See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872) and The Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3 (1883).
117 WELKE, supra note 34, at 145 (“The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 offered one of the
first examples of administrative courts focused on an exclusive subject matter. The
Civil War; Congressional Reconstruction; and the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and
Abandoned Lands were the first large-scale federal experiments in administrative gov-
ernance, more generally.”).
118 STANLEY, supra note 35, at 36 (“After the war the newly created Freedmen’s Bu-
reau enforced the regime of contract. Enjoining former slaves to obey the ‘solemn
obligation of contracts,’ the bureau taught that freedom was inimical not just to coer-
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B. A Founding Failure of Enforcement
The Freedmen’s Bureau was an agency of the War Depart-
ment, staffed by veterans of the Union army.119 Its mandate was no
less than the establishment of a universal free labor and education
system for former slaves,120 a population for whom government ac-
tion had never been a source of much comfort.121 “The Bureau’s
role in supervising labor relations reached its peak in 1866 and
1867,”122 after which time its mission fell to two other agencies, the
military provost courts and the Southern Claims Commission.123 Its
presence was sorely needed in a South that sought black labor des-
perately but could not conceive of having to bargain for it.124
Unfortunately, these three government agencies were much too
short-lived and never had enough funding or staff to meet the
needs of black southerners during Reconstruction . . . The
Freedmen’s Bureau, for example, never had more than 900
cion but to idleness and immorality. The bureau’s chief, Gen. Oliver Otis Howard,
explained the plan for dealing with the ex-slaves: ‘If they can be induced to enter into
contracts, they are taught that there are duties as well as privileges of freedom.’”).
119 DYLAN C. PENNINGROTH, THE CLAIMS OF KINFOLK: AFRICAN AMERICAN PROPERTY
AND COMMUNITY IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY SOUTH 112 (2003) (“In the 1860’s the
U.S. government extended legal rights and protections to four million black
southerners through three major institutions: the provost courts, the Freedmen’s Bu-
reau, and the Southern Claims Commission. Each of these forums had a different
mission and structure, but they all seemed to promise that ex-slaves might soon leave
behind the uncertainties of plantation ‘custom’ for the evenhanded formalism of
law . . . In many regions of the South, the army provost courts continued to act as a
substitute legal system after the war ended. The Freedmen’s Bureau, also a branch of
the army and staffed by army officers, extended and institutionalized the provost mar-
shal’s legal protection of freedpeople.”).
120 W.E.B. Du Bois described a Bureau circular in The Freedmen’s Bureau as follows:
“The Bureau invited continued cooperation with benevolent societies, and declared,
‘It will be the object of all commissioners to introduce practicable systems of compen-
sated labor,’ and to establish schools.” W. E. Burghardt Du Bois, supra note 29, Part
One.
121 See Laura F. Edwards, Status Without Rights: African Americans and the Tangled His-
tory of Law and Governance in the Nineteenth-Century U.S. South, THE AMERICAN HISTORI-
CAL REVIEW 390 (2007) (“Slaves did not so much use law as survive legal proceedings
they had no choice but to endure. Their acceptance of the system might better be
termed resignation. Although they knew that the legal system was capricious, they
nonetheless lived with its processes and understood it as a means to regulate the com-
munities in which they lived. They had to, because legal practice was so thoroughly
integrated into the rhythms of daily life.”).
122 FONER, RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 50, at 166.
123 PENNINGROTH, supra note 119, at 112.
124 BLACKMON, supra note 51, at 39 (“Without former slaves—and their steady ex-
pertise and cooperation in the fields—the white South was crippled. But this new
manifestation of dark-skinned men expected to choose when, where, and how long
they would work.”).
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agents in the South at one time.125
Though beloved by many of the newly free,126 the Bureau had few
other friends,127 and where the agency’s efforts led to successes,
they often came in no small part due to the contributions of freed-
men themselves.128  Indeed, encouraging such self-help was one of
the priorities of the Freedmen’s Bureau and its backers.129
The Bureau and its agents had nothing comparable to the re-
sources and reach of modern federal agencies like the EEOC or
the DOL, but its mandate was vast with paternalistic enthusiasm,
sweeping over not just paid employment130 for freedmen and
freedwomen,131 but also their marriages and households.132
125 PENNINGROTH, supra note 119, at 116.
126 FONER, RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 50, at 169 (“In Wilmington, North Caro-
lina, 800 blacks crowded into the Brick Church to voice support. ‘If the Freedman
Bureau was removed,’ one speaker insisted, ‘a colored man would have better sense
than to speak a word in behalf of the colored man’s rights, for fear of his life.’ Some-
what taken aback, General [John] Steedman asked the assemblage if the army or the
Freedmen’s Bureau had to be withdrawn, which they would prefer to have remain in
the South. From all parts of the church came the reply, ‘The Bureau.’”).
127 Id. at 168 (“‘Of course everyone abuses the Freedmen’s Bureau,’ the British
ambassador reported after a visit to Virginia in early 1866, precisely when agents were
exerting their greatest effort to induce blacks to sign labor contracts. Indeed,
whatever the policies of individual agents, most Southern whites resented the Bureau
as a symbol of Confederate defeat and a barrier to the authority reminiscent of slavery
that planters hoped to impose upon the freedmen. Even if, in individual cases, the
Bureau’s intervention enhanced the power of the employer, the very act of calling
upon a third and ostensibly disinterested party served to undermine his standing, by
making evident to the freedmen that the planter’s authority was not absolute.”).
128 See EVELYN NAKANO GLENN, UNEQUAL FREEDOM: HOW RACE AND GENDER SHAPED
AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP AND LABOR 138 (2002) (“In all localities blacks paid taxes or
contributed in kind. Freedmen’s Bureau records showed that in early 1867 at least
half of the schools in ten southern states received financial assistance from black par-
ents, and that except in Alabama and Florida, black parents put in at least $25 for
every $100 expended by the Freedmen’s Bureau. In Louisiana and Kentucky blacks
paid more toward expenses than the Freedmen’s Bureau.”).
129 STANLEY, supra note 35, at 123 (“Throughout the proclamations of the Freed-
men’s Bureau ran a double message: an affirmation of former slaves’ right to liberty
and a warning that freedom barred dependence. The bureau sought to dispel the
notion that its mission was charitable, aiming its words both at former slaves and at
northerners who shunned the prospect of permanently supporting a free black
population.”).
130 See BLACKMON, supra note 51, at 27 (“Some white plantation owners attempted
to coerce their former slaves into signing ‘lifetime contracts’ to work on the farms.”).
131 See MASUR, supra note 2, at 64 (describing the creation of “several ‘industrial
schools’ to promote freedwomen’s financial independence,” that either taught “hand
and machine sewing” or “were basically large-scale laundries where women washed
and ironed,” and which “offered ‘employment and instruction to some 369 women’”
in 1866).
132 See STANLEY, supra note 35, at 56 (“[I]t was generally acknowledged that emanci-
pation had made freedmen into proprietors of their own persons and labor, giving
them the legal capacity to participate in voluntary exchange relations . . . Slavery’s
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The District of Columbia was not a site of battle during the
Civil War, but had been no stranger to slavery in the antebellum
era, and was host to a large black population that had swelled as
the war ground on,133 partly as a result of the early abolition of
slavery there.134 The Bureau’s extensive efforts in DC were the
agency’s apotheosis, consisting of a range of services for the rap-
idly-arriving freedmen population that included low-income hous-
ing135 and a legal defense program.136
Reconstruction was unprecedented in its scope and ambi-
tion,137 and this assured that the resistance it provoked was broad
and persistent.138 Congress became engaged in a series of
antithesis, agreed legislators from both sides of the Mason-Dixon line, was free con-
tract—the right of self-owning freedmen to sell their labor for wages and to marry and
maintain a household.”).
133 See MASUR, supra note 2, at 19 (“During the antebellum years, Washington’s
black population grew steadily, while the proportion of slaves to free blacks dimin-
ished. In 1860, 78 percent of the local black population was free, up from 73 percent
ten years earlier.”); and 28 (“From 1860 to 1870, Washington’s black population grew
more than any other [city], in both relative and absolute terms. During that decade,
about 29,000 new black residents moved to the capital.”).
134 See FONER, THE FIERY TRIAL, supra note 111, at 201 (“The first federal statute to
grant immediate freedom to any group of slaves, the [April 1862] law ending slavery
in Washington, D.C., fulfilled a long-standing abolitionist dream and marked a signifi-
cant change in federal policy . . . It offered one example of how the war was inexora-
bly expanding federal power.”).
135 MASUR, supra note 2, at 69 (“[B]ureau agents opened their first rental apart-
ments to freedpeople in October 1865, in a former military hospital at the north end
of Seventh Street. By the winter of 1866, the bureau was renting apartments in three
different barracks . . . as well as at the hospital,” an operation that “would continue
into 1868, when the bureau embarked on plans to build new tenements and tear
down the old ones, even as it gradually shut down its other operations.”).
136 Id. at 116 (“[T]he Freedmen’s Bureau began a legal defense program in the
summer of 1866 . . . lawyers working for the Freedmen’s Bureau made themselves
available to people who walked into their office on Pennsylvania Avenue, and they
visited the jail and police stations in search of people who needed legal representa-
tion. The bulk of their work related to enforcement of labor contracts and rental
agreements, but they also sought justice for freedpeople involved in criminal cases,”
making “683 visits to the jail” and working on “291 criminal cases, as well as almost
600 civil ones.”).
137 Id. at 2 (“It was relatively straightforward to decree that human beings could no
longer be considered property and that no one could enjoy the benefits of others’
uncompensated labor. Much more complicated was the question of postemancipation
equality. In the Northeast, slavery’s abolition in the early nineteenth century had led
not to a regime of racial equality, but rather to a society in which both customary and
legal discrimination were commonplace. As southern slavery ended, Americans asked
crucial questions about whether and how to eliminate the features of slavery that
might remain in law and public life even after abolition.”).
138 FONER, RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 50, at 244 (“As the first statutory definition
of the rights of American citizenship, the Civil Rights bill embodied a profound
change in federal-state relations and reflected how ideas once considered Radical had
been adopted by the party’s mainstream.”).
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rearguard actions to defend prior guarantees of rights. The Four-
teenth Amendment was passed to preserve the constitutionality of
the measures taken in the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Reconstruc-
tion Acts followed to help ensure ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and so on.139 Ultimately, federal involvement in the
South was ended as part of the agreement resolving the disputed
election of 1876.140
The Bureau, for its part, could not last that long, failing to
persist to the end of the 1860s.141 W.E.B. Du Bois’ conclusion, look-
ing back at the turn of the twentieth century, was wistful but
unflinching:
It came to regard its work as merely temporary, and Negro suf-
frage as a final answer to all present perplexities. The political
ambition of many of its agents and protégés led it far afield into
questionable activities, until the South, nurturing its own deep
prejudices, came easily to ignore all the good deeds of the Bu-
reau, and hate its very name with perfect hatred. So the Freed-
men’s Bureau died and its child was the Fifteenth
Amendment.142
139 FLYNN, JR., supra note 75, at 37–38 (“And so, one step led to the next: the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, which, despite its questionable constitutionality, invalidated dis-
criminatory black codes; the proposal of the Fourteenth Amendment, which would
bar Confederate leaders from holding any office and make the Civil Rights Act consti-
tutional and immutable; the Reconstruction Acts of 1867, which disfranchised former
Confederate leaders and enfranchised the freedmen in a further effort to get what
Republicans defined as ‘true unionist sentiment’ dominant in the politics of the
South and to get the Fourteenth Amendment ratified; the Fifteenth Amendment to
try to protect the new political system; and the Ku Klux Klan Act to try to counter anti-
Republican and antiblack violence. These congressional actions went much further
than all but the most radical Republicans had anticipated at the end of the war. Each
step was meant to protect the step before, but the cumulative effect was as great as a
second civil war.”).
140 BLACKMON, supra note 51, at 87–88 (“A terrible depression in the 1870s had
finally eased as the South began to emerge from economic ruin. In the disputed presi-
dential election of 1876, white southern political leaders leveraged the electoral col-
lege system to rob the winner of a huge majority of the popular vote, Samuel J.
Tilden, of the White House. In return, the Congress and the administration of the
fraudulent new Republican president, Rutherford B. Hayes, finally removed the last
Union troops from the South and ended a decade of federal occupation of the
region.”).
141 W. E. Burghardt Du Bois, The Freedmen’s Bureau, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar.
1901, Part Two available at http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/issues/01mar/
dubois2.htm  (“The act of 1866 gave the Freedmen’s Bureau its final form,—the form
by which it will be known to posterity and judged of men. It extended the existence of
the Bureau to July, 1868 . . .”).
142 Id.
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C. The Long Winter of the Lochner Era
As with the two other great rights-producing events in United
States history—the American Revolution and the twentieth cen-
tury’s New Deal and civil rights campaigns-the campaign for
human equality that reached its peak during Congressional Recon-
struction was followed by long decades of regression to a less egali-
tarian mean.143 There was some advancement in the enforcement
of individual rights during this dark period, at both the federal144
and state145 levels, and during wartime.146 President Franklin
Roosevelt famously brought the issue of workers’ rights to the fore
of federal policy-making at the close of this period,147 setting the
stage for the gains of the second half of the twentieth century.148
143 See GLENN, supra note 128, at 24 (“Liberalizing changes occurred rarely and usu-
ally only in the context of major social crises. Three periods in which major upheavals
occurred were the years of the American Revolution and Confederation, the Civil War
and Reconstruction, and the post-World War II civil rights era of the 1950s and 1960s.
These times of expanding egalitarianism typically were followed by periods of regres-
sion during which hard-won gains were rolled back and new exclusions put in place—
the current post-civil rights period being an obvious instance.”).
144 See Risa L. Goluboff, The Thirteenth Amendment and the Lost Origins of Civil Rights,
50 DUKE L. J. 1609 (2001) (describing efforts of the first civil rights section of the U.S.
Department of Justice to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment in the 1930s and 40s,
before the major civil rights campaigns began).
145 See David Freeman Engstrom, The Lost Origins of American Fair Employment Law:
Regulatory Choice and the Making of Modern Civil Rights, 1943-1972, 63 STAN. L. REV.
1071, 1079 (2011) (“By the time Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, nearly two dozen nonsouthern states that were home to more than ninety per-
cent of African Americans outside the South had already enacted legislation mandat-
ing equal treatment in employment.”).
146 See Jeffrey A. Jenkins & Justin Peck, Building Toward Major Policy Change: Congres-
sional Action on Civil Rights, 1941-1950, 31 LAW & HIST. REV. 139, 174 (2013) (describ-
ing how Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1941 “issued Executive Order 8802 to formally
prohibit ‘discriminatory employment practices because of race, color, creed or na-
tional origin in government service, defense industries, and by trade unions,’” declar-
ing it “ ‘the duty of employers and of labor organizations . . . to provide for the full
and equitable participation of all workers in defense industries, without discrimina-
tion because of race, creed color, or national origins,’” and creating “the non-sala-
ried, five-man FEPC,” to administer the regime).
147 In his famous “Commonwealth Club” speech in 1932, Franklin D. Roosevelt
said: “We know that individual liberty and individual happiness mean nothing unless
both are ordered in the sense that one man’s meat is not another man’s poison. We
know that the old ‘rights of personal competency’—the right to read, to think, to
speak, to choose and live a mode of life, must be respected at all hazards. We know
that liberty to do anything which deprives others of those elemental rights is outside
the protection of any compact; and that government in this regard is the maintenance
of a balance, within which every individual may have a place if he will take it; in which
every individual may find safety if he wishes it; in which every individual may attain
such power as his ability permits, consistent with his assuming the accompanying re-
sponsibility.” See supra note 63.
148 See William E. Forbath, Civil Rights and Economic Citizenship: Notes on the Past and
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For the most part, however, the guardians of individual liberty
in the Lochner era turned the equalizing guarantees of Reconstruc-
tion on their head to maintain the retrograde employment condi-
tions of the antebellum era,149 aided by sympathetic Southern state
governments and a disinterested federal government.150 The result
for many of the descendants of the freedmen was a life little differ-
ent than what their parents and grandparents had experienced
before Emancipation.151 There were advances as well, including
some that were the result of more active agency enforcement of
existing labor laws,152 and others that were the result of legislative
efforts.153
The passage of another Civil Rights Act would not come for
nearly a century.154 It was only after this milestone that the modern
notion of formal, universal equality under law finally began to be
Future of the Civil Rights and Labor Movements, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 697, 702 (2000)
(“Jim Crow stood between the popular support the New Deal vision of social citizen-
ship enjoyed and its enactment into law. The era saw a sustained effort to oust him.”).
149 LAURA F. EDWARDS, THE PEOPLE AND THEIR PEACE: LEGAL CULTURE AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF INEQUALITY IN THE POST-REVOLUTIONARY SOUTH 297 (2009)
(“Workers also resorted to legal appeals, trying to use Fourteenth Amendment rights
to alter the balance of power at the workplace. But the courts consistently used the
Fourteenth Amendment against them, maintaining that the ability to contract was a
protected right.”).
150 BLACKMON, supra note 51, at 157 (“Nearly every southern state, including Ala-
bama, had completed the total disenfranchisement of African Americans by 1901.
Virtually no blacks served on state juries. No blacks in the South were permitted to
hold meaningful state or local political offices. There were virtually no black sheriffs,
constables, or police officers. Blacks had been wholly shunted into their own inferior
railroad cars, restrooms, restaurants, neighborhoods, and schools. All of this had been
accomplished in a sudden, unfettered grab by white supremacists that was met outside
the South with little more than quiet assent. During the thirty years since Reconstruc-
tion—despite its being a period of nearly continuous Republican control of the White
House—federal officials raised only the faintest concerns about white abuse of black
laborers.”).
151 Id. at 300 (“That was the work available to an independent black man like
Green: free labor camps that functioned like prisons, cotton tenancy that equated to
serfdom, or prison mines filled with slaves. The alternatives, reserved for African
Americans who crossed a white man or the law, were even more grim.”).
152 See generally Goluboff, supra note 144.
153 See Jenkins & Peck, supra note 146, at 193–94 (describing how Representative
Adam Clayton Powell considered his National School Lunch Act of 1946 to be “‘the
first civil rights amendment’ to pass Congress in the post-Reconstruction era”).
154 See William E. Nelson, The Changing Meaning of Equality in Twentieth-Century Con-
stitutional Law, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 100 (1995) (“An obvious question that some
might want to ask is when the shift to rights-centered constitutionalism occurred.
Three dates suggest themselves. The first is 1938 — the year of United States v.
Carolene Products Co. and of New York’s Constitutional Convention. The second is
1954—the year of Brown v. Board of Education. The third is the mid-1960s—the years
of African-American and antiwar protest and of a solid liberal majority on the Warren
Court.”).
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enforced, and started to gain wider purchase in American soci-
ety.155 In the decade following, black Americans saw for the first
time a measurable improvement in their economic conditions rela-
tive to whites; an effect that has either leveled off or reversed as the
private right of action has become the primary means of
enforcement.156
The system of laws regulating labor in the United States today
imposes a broader set of conditions on the at-will employment con-
tract than just the non-discrimination at the heart of the twentieth
century’s two Civil Rights Acts. These conditions include a right to
overtime, paid break periods,157 generally safe working condi-
tions,158 qualified rights to religious and disability accommoda-
tion,159 as well as unpaid medical leave,160 and protection from
retaliation or other extra-contractual wrongs.161 The Civil Rights
Act of 1866 was revived by the Supreme Court a few years after the
passage of its modern successor,162 and it lives on today as Section
1981, a private anti-discrimination cause of action.163
However, employees still require reliable third parties to en-
force these rights. For the most part, those third parties are govern-
ment regulatory agencies,164 but they may also be private counsel,
where fee-shifting statutes make such representation possible, and
155 John J. Donohue III & James J. Heckman, Symposium: The Law and Economics of
Racial Discrimination in Employment: Re-Evaluating Federal Civil Rights Policy, 79 GEO. L. J.
1713, 1715 (1991) (“Between 1920 and 1990 there were only two periods in which
black incomes rose relative to white incomes: during the economic rebound from the
Great Depression induced by World War II, and in the decade following the launch-
ing of an intensive federal effort to guarantee the civil rights of blacks.”).
156 Id. at 1729–30 (“[F]ederal antidiscrimination law is a powerful tool in attacking
egregious forms of discrimination, such as that existing most conspicuously in the
pre-1965 South,” but that the “process of breaking down these blatant barriers to
black advancement in employment, schooling, voting, and housing was complete by
roughly 1975.” Furthermore, “once the egregious forms of exclusion have been elimi-
nated, a law enforced by the complaints of alleged victims of discrimination is not
likely to produce further significant black improvement,” and in fact “there has been
little improvement in the relative earnings of non-Southern blacks since the passage
of Title VII and for Southern blacks after the egregious segregation was
dismantled.”).
157 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2013).
158 Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (2013).
159 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12113 (2013).
160 Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2013).
161 See, e.g., CBOCS West v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 446 (2008) (holding that
Section 1981 encompasses retaliation claims).
162 See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
163 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
164 See KUTZ & MEYER, supra note 70, at “GAO Highlights” (“GAO’s overall assess-
ment of the [Wage and Hour Division] complaint intake, conciliation, and investiga-
tion processes found an ineffective system that discourages wage theft complaints.”).
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unions, where they still exist.165 For-profit employment discrimina-
tion litigators are hardly guaranteed to secure compensation for
the injuries suffered by their clients,166 but nevertheless they must
look at the likelihood of such an outcome above all other factors in
choosing which claims to pursue. Although there are some non-
profit organizations that are immune to this revenue-generating
concern and are able to have a limited impact,167 the elimination
of prevalent and longstanding violations of labor standards in the
American economy continues to be the heritage and mandate of
the government agencies charged with enforcing these laws.
III.
A. The Value of a Disposable Workforce
The pervasive and deep-seated racism that motivated the en-
slavement of black Americans168 continues to contribute to their
oppression in the workplace and practically everywhere else.
Michelle Alexander has convincingly argued that the predominant
uses of force of law against black Americans have shifted, particu-
larly since the beginning of the War on Drugs in the 1980s, from
the civil and contractual to the criminal and penal.169 This large-
scale removal from the workforce has allowed particular oppres-
165 Union Membership (Annual) News Release, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Jan. 24,
2014), www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.htm (reporting that the rate of private-sec-
tor unionization in 2012 was “11.3 percent, down from 11.8 percent in 2011”).
166 See Laura Beth Nielsen et al., Individual Justice or Collective Legal Mobilization? Em-
ployment Discrimination Litigation in the Post Civil Rights United States, 7 J. OF EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 175, 178 (2010) (“In discrimination cases, what begins as a moral contest
over whether discrimination occurred progressively becomes rede?ned as a shifting
set of cost bene?t analyses about how to dispose of a dispute before proceeding to the
next, more costly stage. EDL cases are treated more harshly by the courts, with lower
levels of settlement rates, higher rates of summary judgment motions against plain-
tiffs, higher plaintiff loss rates, and higher appellate reversal rates of plaintiff awards
than is the case for other kinds of civil litigation.”).
167 This author’s clinical program, which represents individuals bringing a variety
of employment-related claims on a pro bono basis, is an example of one such organi-
zation. See http://www.law.du.edu/index.php/profile/raja-raghunath (last visited
Jan. 11, 2015).
168  Alexander Stephens, Confederate Vice President, Corner Stone Speech (Mar.
21, 1861), http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?documentprint=76
(infamously declared in 1861 that the Confederacy’s “foundations are laid, its corner-
stone rests, upon the great truth that the negro is not equal to the white man; that
slavery subordination to the superior race is his natural and normal condition”).
169 See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IS THE AGE
OF COLORBLINDNESS 21 (2010) (“Since the nation’s founding, African Americans re-
peatedly have been controlled through institutions such as slavery and Jim Crow,
which appear to die, but then are reborn in new form, tailored to the needs and
constraints of the time.”).
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sions that were pioneered on working black Americans to spread to
new generations of workers,170 in particular workers who are es-
tranged from formal law and its enforcement mechanisms.171
An example of the nadir of American employment practices
today can be found in the immigrant-heavy domestic meatpacking
industry,172 which in the first decade of the twenty-first century fa-
mously experienced large-scale federal enforcement actions of
both the immigration laws and labor laws, in some instances at the
same facilities.173 As catalogued in the journalist Eric Schlosser’s
best-selling book Fast Food Nation, the role of immigrant labor in
domestic food production is concededly part of a larger story that
yields many other examples of injustices resonant of Reconstruc-
tion; for example, tenant farming becoming as widespread as
sharecropping,174 or the inevitable emergence of the rural South as
a site of the worst practices.175
170 Id. at 18 (“[M]ass incarceration is designed to warehouse a population deemed
disposable—unnecessary to the functioning of the new global economy—while ear-
lier systems of control were designed to exploit and control black labor.”).
171 See ABEL VALENZUELA JR. ET AL., ON THE CORNER: DAY LABOR IN THE UNITED
STATES (2006), http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/issr/csup/uploaded_files/Natl_Day
Labor-On_the_Corner1.pdf. See also LINDA BURNHAM & NIK THEODORE, HOME
ECONOMICS: THE INVISIBLE AND UNREGULATED WORLD OF DOMESTIC WORK xi–xii
(2012) (“[Eighty-five] percent of undocumented immigrants who encountered
problems with their working conditions in the prior 12 months did not complain
because they feared their immigration status would be used against them.”).
172 See Alexander, supra note 81, at 373–75 (citing estimates of 25%-60% of “periph-
eral poultry jobs” being held by immigrant workers, with “large numbers” undocu-
mented, and noting that poultry industry’s “high-turnover labor regime can only
function if (1) there is an unending supply of new workers ready to take the vacant
jobs and (2) transaction costs are low enough such that turnover is relatively costless.
The transnational labor market meets both criteria.”).
173 See JERRY KAMMER, THE 2006 SWIFT RAIDS: ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS AT SIX FACILITIES, CENTER FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES 2009; and
Press Release, The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, EEOC Sues JBS
Swift for Religious and National Origin Discrimination in Colorado and Nebraska
(Aug. 31, 2010), www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/8-31-10.cfm). In full
disclosure, the author of this article is private counsel for six intervening plaintiffs in
one of the above EEOC actions.
174 SCHLOSSER, supra note 17, at 118 (“Over the past twenty-five years, Idaho has lost
about half of its potato farmers. During the same period, the amount of land devoted
to potatoes has increased. Family farms are giving way to corporate farms that stretch
for thousands of acres. These immense corporate farms are divided into smaller hold-
ings for administrative purposes, and farmers who’ve been driven off the land are
often hired to manage them. The patterns of land ownership in the American West
more and more resemble those of rural England.”).
175 Id. at 139 (“The poultry industry was also transformed by a wave of mergers in
the 1980s. Eight chicken processors now control about two-thirds of the American
market. These processors have shifted almost all of their production to the rural
South, where the weather tends to be mild, the workforce is poor, unions are weak,
and farmers are desperate to find some way of staying on their land. Alabama, Arkan-
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The astonishing brutality and inhumanity of meatpacking
work, performed under modern just-in-time production condi-
tions,176 affects all workers in the industry, native-born or immi-
grant, authorized or not. But the meatpacking industry could not
use up and discard workers at the pace that it does177 without some
assurance that the vast majority so used will not press their case
very far with the authorities, if at all.178 This is an assurance that a
largely undocumented workforce can provide.179
The meatpacking industry is not the only employment sector
crying out for the enforcement of labor standards at the low end of
worker income.180 Many so-called marginal or peripheral employ-
sas, Georgia, and Mississippi now produce more than half the chicken raised in the
United States.”).
176 Id. at 173 (“One of the leading determinants of the injury rate at a slaughter-
house today is the speed of the disassembly line. The faster it runs, the more likely
that workers will get hurt. The old meatpacking plants in Chicago slaughtered about
50 cattle an hour. Twenty years ago, new plants in the High Plains slaughtered about
175 cattle an hour. Today some plants slaughter up to 400 cattle an hour—about half
a dozen animals every minute, sent down a single production line, carved by workers
desperate not to fall behind.”).
177 Id. at 172 (“Meatpacking is now the most dangerous job in the United States.
The injury rate in a slaughterhouse is about three times higher than the rate in a
typical American factory. Every year about one out of three meatpacking workers in
this country—roughly forty-three thousand men and women—suffer an injury or a
work-related illness that requires medical attention beyond first aid. There is strong
evidence that these numbers, compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, understate
the number of meatpacking injuries that occur. Thousands of additional injuries and
illnesses most likely go unrecorded.”).
178 Id. at 160 (“Having broken the union at the Greeley slaughterhouse, Monfort
began to employ a different sort of worker there: recent immigrants, many of them
illegals. In the 1980s large numbers of young men and women from Mexico, Central
America, and Southeast Asia started traveling to rural Colorado. Meatpacking jobs
that had once provided a middle-class American life now offered little more than
poverty wages. Instead of a waiting list, the slaughterhouse seemed to acquire a revolv-
ing door, as Monfort plowed through new hires to fill the roughly nine hundred jobs.
During one eighteen-month period, more than five thousand different people were
employed at the Greeley beef plant—an annual turnover rate of about 400 percent.
The average worker quit or was fired every three months.”).
179 See Ted Conover, The Way of All Flesh: Undercover in an Industrial Slaughterhouse,
HARPER’S MAGAZINE, May 2013, at 46 (“Local 293, meanwhile, has not staged a major
labor action in years. Some 1,300 people at the Schuyler plant are still unionized. And
Greenwood says the union sticks up for its members: ‘Somebody gets screwed, we’ll
take them all the way to court.’ But strikes, as he explains, are another thing: why walk
off the job to ensure some oldtimer’s vacation pay if you may lose your job the next
week in a Homeland Security raid? Still, says Greenwood, the passage of time has
strengthened the union’s hand, as the first wave of Latino immigrants becomes more
established in Schuyler: ‘A lot of them are staying put. They’ve become citizens,
they’re second-generation, and so tomorrow means something for them now.’”).
180 See Alexander, supra note 81, at 398 (“For example, in its current Strategic Plan,
the Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division has already named ‘meat and
poultry processing’ as an industry with prevalent overtime misclassification.”).
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ers also routinely violate labor standards.181 Under labor market
segmentation theory, “peripheral” employers “tend to be smaller,
less stable, and less profitable.” These employers
draw their workforce from the secondary labor market, require
little worker skill, and provide little training. Peripheral firms do
not invest in their workforce, and workers become fungible and
easily replaceable, with low bargaining power. The results are
low wages, job insecurity, and lack of promotion opportunities –
the hallmarks of secondary jobs.182
This describes the employment situation of most day laborers, the
bottom rung of wage earners in the American economy and a cate-
gory of workers overwhelmingly composed of the unauthorized.183
On the one hand, the continued enforcement of wage and
antidiscrimination laws seems widely accepted, so that critics of
such laws who advocate for alternative regimes will readily concede
that their positions are outside the mainstream.184 Yet the political
valences completely reverse when the question becomes whether
unauthorized workers should be protected alongside the author-
ized workforce. It is hard to picture any national politician today
making a full-throated endorsement of the rights of unauthorized
workers to sue under employment laws.185 Over a decade later, the
central question that was raised by Hoffman Plastic—does the work
done by the unauthorized properly fall within coverage of our
workplace protections, and if so, which ones?—remains unsettled
for good reason.186
181 See GARCIA, supra note 4, at 9 (“In labor economics, the term has a specific
meaning: marginal workers are those in irregular employment, because they are part-
time, contractors, or disabled. In a broader sense, many workers are marginalized by
the lines of demarcation in statutes themselves. The National Labor Relations Act, for
example, excludes agricultural workers and those in domestic service. All statutes ex-
clude independent contractors, and cover only those who are considered ‘employees’
who work under the control of an employer.”).
182 Alexander, supra note 81, at 356–57.
183 See VALENZUELA JR. ET AL., supra note 171, at iii (National Day Labor Study 2006)
(“The day-labor workforce in the United States is predominantly immigrant and La-
tino. Most day laborers were born in Mexico (59 percent) and Central America (28
percent), but the third-largest group (7 percent) was born in the United States. Two-
fifths (40 percent) of day laborers have lived in the United States for more than 6
years. Three-quarters (75 percent) of the day-labor workforce are undocumented mi-
grants. About 11 percent of the undocumented day-labor workforce has a pending
application for an adjustment of their immigration status.”).
184 See EPSTEIN, supra note 44, at 499 (“This position leaves me securely outside the
mainstream.”).
185 See GARCIA, supra note 4, at 60 (“[T]here is no political will to restore employee
rights to undocumented immigrants.”).
186 See NGAI, supra note 3, at 229 (“The civil rights movement was incontrovertibly
about winning full and equal citizenship for African Americans, but citizenship occu-
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B. Otherness as Externality
The immigration debate in modern America is a manifesta-
tion of age-old human territoriality,187 and so it is deeply felt and
fiercely fought.188 Like the debate over fiscal policy, it is also ham-
pered by a seemingly common-sense, but deeply misinformed,
analogy between household and nation. Just as the merits and
drawbacks of sovereign borrowing are fundamentally different
from private borrowing, so is the violation of immigration entry
regulations fundamentally different from private trespass.
The issue of whether a particular worker “should” be working
in this country in the first place is not relevant to whether that
worker should be paid for time already worked, or that would have
been worked absent his unlawful discharge.189 This is particularly
true where effectively exempting such a worker from existing laws
requiring payment would create an incentive to hire him over an
authorized worker,190 presumably the opposite of what is sought by
immigration opponents. An entire class of workers who are already
participating in the national economy cannot be excluded from cov-
erage of the law without negatively affecting the other participants
in that economy, whatever else is thought of those excluded
workers.191
pied a more ambiguous and problematic position in immigration policy and reform
discourse. Immigrants are aliens, not citizens—a fundamental distinction in legal sta-
tus that bears on the scope of rights held by each class of persons, beginning with the
right to be territorially present.”).
187 See, e.g., JARED DIAMOND, THE WORLD UNTIL YESTERDAY: WHAT CAN WE LEARN
FROM TRADITIONAL SOCIETIES? 947-950 (2012) (“Traditional peoples, living in societies
of a few hundred individuals, obtain access to others’ lands by being known individu-
ally, by having individual relationships there, and by asking permission individually.
In our societies of hundreds of millions, our definition of ‘relationship’ is extended to
any citizen of our state or of a friendly state, and the asking of permission is formal-
ized and granted en masse by means of passports and visas.”).
188 See Kurt Schilchter, The Immigration “Crisis” is No Crisis, THE TOWNHALL (June 1,
2013, 12:01 AM), http://townhall.com/columnists/kurtschlichter/2013/06/13/the-
immigration-crisis-no-crisis-n1618034 (“[W]hy [should we] just give citizenship away
to people who have already disrespected us by coming here uninvited?”).
189 But see Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
190 See Chen, supra note 40, at 232 (“The combined effect of Hoffman and IRCA was
to create perverse economic incentives for employers to exploit immigrant workers
suspected of lacking status and to dim the prospects for immigrant workers to chal-
lenge those abuses. The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) aggressive use of
workplace raids as a strategy for immigration control—first under President Bush and
continuing under President Obama, albeit to a lesser extent—has exacerbated the
situation, making credible employer threats to expose the status of their immigrant
workers lacking documentation in retaliation for those workers’ complaints.”).
191 But see ZOLBERG, supra note 7, at 12 (“As the complexity of contemporary de-
bates on immigration policy in the affluent liberal democracies indicates, ‘utility’ en-
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The argument is more difficult for antidiscrimination laws.
Some immigration opponents use the fact that the bulk of modern
immigrants would fall under one or more protected classes as a
reason to oppose further legal or illegal immigration.192 This seems
to be a larger complaint about the modern antidiscrimination re-
gime, but nevertheless the temptation is to conclude that the way
to resolve the second-class status of unauthorized workers is to re-
solve the second-class status of unauthorized immigrants
generally.193
The freedmen were considered deserving of the lesser treat-
ment they received, for their labor among many other things,194
because most whites considered inferiority to be in their essential
nature. The reasons today for considering unauthorized workers
unprotected by the labor standards that apply to other workers are
ostensibly different than racial inferiority—not essentialist on their
face, but conduct-based—yet the effect is the same: to create a class
of workers on whose labor individuals and businesses are reliably
able to make a greater profit margin than a worker to whom all
compasses not only a population’s economic value, but also its putative value in
relation to cultural and political objectives.”).
192 KRIKORIAN supra note 5, at 35 (“Whatever the merits of affirmative action, it
would not be an assimilation issue if most new immigrants were what bureaucrats now
call ‘non-Hispanic whites,’ and thus ineligible for affirmative-action benefits. But the
overwhelming majority of immigrants are immediately eligible as members of ‘pro-
tected classes.’ Immigrants from Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, and East and
South Asia—i.e., ‘minorities’—accounted for 87 percent of new immigration during
the first half of this decade.”).
193 See, e.g., Karla Mari McKanders, Immigration Enforcement and the Fugitive Slave Acts:
Exploring Their Similarities, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 921, 951–52 (2012) (“There is a striking
similarity in the regulation of both slaves and migrant workers to low paying and low
status jobs. Slaves performed jobs such as agricultural and household work. Today,
both documented and undocumented migratory workers are pigeonholed into low
paying agriculture, household, and construction jobs. In both positions, the law facili-
tates the exploitation of the most vulnerable population. The Reconstruction Amend-
ments were intended to ‘abolish[ ] all class legislation in the States and [do] away
with the injustices of subjecting one caste of persons to a code not applicable to an-
other.’ Similarly, when immigration law and policy begin to recognize the humanity
of the subjects of the laws, there will be more equitable policies towards immigrants
who come to the United States as economic migrants. Most acknowledge that
‘[s]lavery was a system of racial adjustment and social order.’ So, too, is an immigra-
tion regime that has the indirect effect of targeting the poorest immigrants of
color.”).
194 WILKERSON, supra note 106, at 112 (“‘They done cheated you out of three dol-
lars somewhere ’cause if you picked the number of boxes you say you picked, you
didn’t get paid for all of it. Two or three days’ pay had disappeared. It was hard to
keep up . . .  ‘Sometimes they would tell you that they paying one thing and when you
get your pay, you got less,’ George said. ‘And if you couldn’t figure, you didn’t know
the difference. They were very good at that.’”).
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wages owed are paid as a matter of course (presumably the
norm).195
In this light, the conservative protest that the protected-class
rights framework should only ever have applied to racism against
black Americans,196 and lightly there,197 misses the point. The com-
mon thread between the centuries has always been the particular
exploitative conduct that required regulation to make workers’
rights meaningful, rather than the various subjective reasons given
to justify that conduct.198
Reactionary Southerners during Reconstruction considered it
“illegitimate” for freedmen to work for their own benefit, rather
than for the benefit of the whites.199 The unauthorized immigrant,
a figure both unwelcome and ubiquitous in modern society,200 oc-
cupies a similar role in domestic production processes.201 His labor
is provided at a discount so that consumers may purchase goods
and services at the lower prices to which they have grown accus-
tomed.202 But this particular discount comes almost entirely from a
unique and contradictory legal status that makes his actual pres-
195 See, e.g., id. at 101 (“It took fourteen hundred pounds to make a bale, and
George needed to make a bale every two or three days in the picking season. Mr. Edd
took half.”).
196 See OLSON, supra note 14, at 87 (“The history of identity politics, like the history
of discrimination law, has been built on a continuing series of analogies to the condi-
tion of blacks, each less convincing than the last.”).
197 See BERNSTEIN, supra note 45, at 110 (arguing that, although the “classical liberal
vision of civil rights admittedly holds little utopian promise,” in its favor, “unlike the
modern regime, the classical liberal vision does not depend on granting the govern-
ment massive regulatory powers . . .”).
198 The blogger Ta-Nehesi Coates once described “interviewing a gentleman who’d
migrated up from the South in the 1930s,” during which he “asked him why he’d left.”
The man responded that, “he was looking for ‘protection of the law.’” Ta-Nehesi
Coates, The Guileless ‘Accidental Racism’ of Paula Deen, THE ATLANTIC (June 24, 2013
11:40 AM), www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/06/the-guileless-accidental-
racism-of-paula-deen/277153).
199 FLYNN, Jr., supra note 75, at 58.
200 NGAI, supra note 3, at 4-5 (“But restriction meant much more than fewer people
entering the country; it also invariably generated illegal immigration and introduced
that problem into the internal spaces of the nation. Immigration restriction produced
the illegal alien as a new legal and political subject, whose inclusion within the nation
was simultaneously a social reality and a legal impossibility - a subject barred from
citizenship and without rights. Moreover, the need of state authorities to identify and
distinguish between citizens, lawfully resident immigrants, and illegal aliens posed en-
forcement, political, and constitutional problems for the modern state.”).
201 See Wilkerson, supra note 106, at 31 (“The hand had determined that white peo-
ple were in charge and colored people were under them and had to obey them like a
child in those days had to obey a parent, except there was no love between the two
parties as there is between a parent and child. Instead there was mostly fear and de-
pendence—and hatred of that dependence—on both sides.”).
202 NGAI, supra note 3, at 2 (“Undocumented immigrants are at once welcome and
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ence anathema for many of those same consumers.203
Sunstein described the difference between coordination
problems, which have stable solutions, and collective action
problems that are unstable, and therefore require active manage-
ment. Traffic lights are an example of a solution to a coordination
problem: we would all like a system to regulate who gets to go
when, and once in place, we are all happy to adhere to it (for the
most part). The labor market is, in contrast, a collective action
problem: we would act in our immediate best interest without re-
gard to the welfare of others or optimal efficiency overall.204 Ex-
cept that the labor market that readers of this article enjoy is likely
constrained in part by the same sorts of social expectations that
permit traffic engineers to assume that traffic lights will mainly be
observed by drivers – that is, we remain capable of being outraged
by egregious violations of these rules.
What allows many to systematically depart from this behavior is
the absence of effective social sanction—those affected are
“others,” not people we care about or identify with.205 The Rever-
end Martin Luther King Jr., among many others, has made this
observation.206 This dynamic is what drove exploitation of the
unwelcome; they are woven into the economic fabric of the nation, but as labor that is
cheap and disposable.”).
203 See, e.g., id., at 36 (“Sociologist John Torpey points out that nationality is a legal
fact that, to be implemented in practice, must be codified and not merely imagined.
While ‘citizen’ is defined as an abstract, universal subject, the citizenry is not an ab-
straction but, in fact, a collection of identifiable corporeal bodies.”).
204 See Bagenstos, supra note 48, at 14–15 (“One particular threat to social equality
is the phenomenon of asymmetric vulnerability. Where one individual is especially
vulnerable to the exercise of another’s economic power, and the vulnerability is not
reciprocated, it will be easier for the less vulnerable person to establish a relationship
of domination over the more vulnerable one. Asymmetric vulnerability is a particular
concern in employment markets—especially in times of high unemployment. For an
individual worker, having and keeping a job is supremely important. For the em-
ployer, by contrast, individual employees are often replaceable or even fungible. For
the worker, the loss of a job can lead to the loss of the means of making a living and of
obtaining respect from self and community. Where jobs are scarce, a worker might be
willing to subordinate herself in all sorts of ways to ensure that she doesn’t lose
hers.”).
205 See ZOLBERG, supra note 7, at 339 (“Dominated by undocumented border-cross-
ing Mexicans, with the remainder consisting mostly of visa ‘overstayers’ from widely
ranging sources, including Caribbean Islanders as well as some Asians and Africans, in
the eyes of many the unauthorized flow reinforced immigration’s disquieting
otherness.”).
206 ALEXANDER, supra note 169, at 242 (“King recognized that it was this indiffer-
ence to the plight of other races that supported the institutions of slavery and Jim
Crow. In his words, ‘One of the great tragedies of man’s long trek along the highway
of history has been the limiting of neighborly concern to tribe, race, class or nation.’
The consequence of this narrow, insular attitude ‘is that one does not really mind
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freedmen, and it is what drives exploitation of the day laborer. As
one social scientist described it in the context of public benefits
policies, “diversity decreases the demand for redistribution by lim-
iting solidarity and trust, the bases for a strong welfare state.”207
In economic terms, the harms suffered by workers “who
shouldn’t be here anyway” are externalities, while identical harms
to “hardworking Americans” with whom an employer identifies are
able to be revisited back upon a wrongdoer through social sanc-
tion.208 This causes some of that harm to be factored into a poten-
tial wrongdoer’s calculus of the costs and benefits of
discriminating, or failing to pay wages or overtime. Another way to
make this process occur is through the increased enforcement of
employment laws, targeted to situations where other enablers of
social sanction are absent.
This would represent a significant shift in federal enforcement
priorities. For unauthorized immigrants, the role of the United
States government in their lives is defined by its ever-present threat
to detain and exile them, likely following a chance encounter or
unexpected event.209 Immigration enforcement presently con-
sumes more of the executive branch’s primary enforcement
budget than the rest of federal law enforcement combined.210 The
way the historian Laura Edwards described the situation of the
freedmen during Reconstruction is apt to today’s unauthorized
workers: they sit outside of full membership of society and many
what happens to the people outside his group.’”) (quoting MARTIN LUTHER KING JR.,
STRENGTH TO LOVE (1963)).
207 Hana E. Brown, Race, Legality, and the Social Policy Consequences of Anti-Immigration
Mobilization, 78 AM. SOC. REV. 290, 298 (2013) (citations omitted).
208 See ZOLBERG, supra note 7, at 95 (“Considered together, these measures amount
to deliberate efforts to erect an internal boundary, not simply between natives and
aliens, as suggested by historians of nativism, but somewhat more ambiguously be-
tween ‘Americans’ and ‘Un-Americans.’ All natives were not equally American, nor all
aliens equally un-American: the boundary builders placed on the one side well-be-
haved native-born and immigrants, and on the other disturbing aliens and Americans
who adopt alien ways.”).
209 The journalist Jose Antonio Vargas, who has publicly revealed his own unautho-
rized work status, attempts to provide a more complete picture of unauthorized immi-
grants’ day-to-day lives than just this, however. He tweets under the handle
@joseiswriting. Jose Antonio Vargas, TWITTER.COM, https://twitter.com/joseiswriting
(last visited Jan. 11, 2015).
210 See MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 10, at 9 (finding that “the U.S. government
spends more on its immigration enforcement agencies than on all its other principal
criminal federal law enforcement agencies combined. In FY 2012, spending for CBP,
ICE, and US-VISIT reached nearly $18 billion. This amount exceeds by approximately
24 percent total spending for the FBI, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Se-
cret Service, U.S. Marshals Service, and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and
Explosives (ATF), which stood at $14.4 billion in FY 2012.”).
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are not used to summoning law to their aid, only to being
summoned.211
The danger is that such an outreach effort would be viewed
with hostility by native-born Americans who “perceived [equal
rights] as a zero-sum game,” such that “the extension of rights to
new members might be considered a dilution just as much as an
expansion.”212 Indeed, this was the tenor of much of the reaction
to the Executive Action announced in late 2014 to normalize the
status of up to five million undocumented immigrants.213 It was the
late twentieth-century shift from cultural assimilation to multicul-
turalism that fueled a now-popular view of individual rights as a
limited resource over which to compete, rather than an expanding
pie.214 The state of Colorado made this argument, among others,
to the Supreme Court in Romer v. Evans,215 complaining that re-
quiring it to recognize same-sex equality would detract from the
rights of existing protected classes.216 Kenji Yoshino has concluded
from the prevalence of what he calls this “pluralism anxiety” that a
“new equal protection” will be needed to move forward.217
It would not be productive to respond to this anxiety by at-
tempting to return to the low immigration levels of the middle part
of the last century.218 Any such effort would create difficult (never
211 Edwards, supra note 121, at 374.
212 Geoffrey Heeren, Persons Who Are Not the People: The Changing Rights of Immigrants
in the United States, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 367, 430 (2013).
213 See FoxNews.com, Illegal Immigrants to be Eligible for Social Security, Medicare,
FOXNEWS.COM, Nov. 27, 2014, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/11/27/illegal-
immigrants-to-be-eligible-for-social-security-medicare/ (“Stephen Miller, a spokesman
for Sen. Jeff Sessions of Alabama, a leading Republican opponent of Obama’s
executive actions, said making immigrants illegally in the U.S. eligible for Social
Security and Medicare ‘is an attack on working families.’”),
214 Nelson, supra note 154, at 75 (“Whereas early egalitarians had pursued the goal
of enabling the urban, immigrant underclass to adopt elite, WASP cultural norms and
thereby assimilate and integrate into the mainstream of society, newer rights egalitari-
ans ceased to show respect for traditional norms and instead demanded that subordi-
nated groups receive the right to develop their own culture and to live by their own
lights on a level playing field with others.”).
215 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
216 Id. at 635 (“Colorado also cites its interest in conserving resources to fight dis-
crimination against other groups.”).
217 Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 796-97 (2011)
(“Equality claims inevitably involve the Court in picking favorites among groups, a
practice attended by pluralism anxiety. Liberty claims, in contrast, emphasize what all
Americans (or, more precisely, all persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States) have in common. The claim that we all have a right to sexual intimacy, or that
we all have a right to access the courts, will hold no matter how many new groups
appear in this country. As such, liberty-based dignity claims may be one way in which
we fashion a new, more inclusive sense of ‘we.’”).
218 See ZOLBERG, supra note 7, at 254 (“Thanks to the new law and postwar business
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mind inadvisable) tensions in the modern world. The already-mas-
sive immigration enforcement apparatus would need to grow even
larger, operate extensively within the country’s interior—separat-
ing and culling individuals from workplaces, families, and neigh-
borhoods—and cause vast amounts of human suffering.
Opponents of immigration gloss over the level of suffering that in-
dividuals living in the United States would need to endure to
choose to “self-deport.”219 Much like letting the poor and old die
on emergency room steps rather than expend public resources to
treat them, it is something that, if made reality, would provoke
strong opposition in our society, as it should.220
Increased government enforcement dollars should instead be
directed towards what can be more directly improved with compa-
rable effort. The systematic violation of labor standards, such as the
wage and antidiscrimination laws, by employers of low-wage and
vulnerable workers, in particular the unauthorized, causes harm to
competing employers who refrain from that behavior, as well as all
other workers in that industry. The empirical consensus is that in-
creased immigration is positively correlated to national economic
growth,221 with many accompanying benefits to all.222 In response,
doldrums, European immigration dipped by two-thirds from 652,364 in 1921 to a
mere 216,385 the following year. The restrictionist scholar Roy Garis contended that
‘according to a careful estimate [the measure] kept from our shores 1,750,000 to
2,000,000 immigrants, few of whom we would have been prepared to receive and care
for in a year of unemployment and readjustment.’ However, arrivals then climbed
back to 364,339 in 1924, approximately the maximum level attainable under the new
law.”). See also id. at 269 (“Documented Mexican immigration was brought down fur-
ther to 3,333 in 1931, lowered to 2,171 the following year, and kept at roughly that
level for the remainder of the decade. Moreover, according to the Census, the Mexi-
can-born population in the four southwestern states (Arizona, California, New Mex-
ico, and Texas), which numbered 616,998 in 1930, dropped to 377,433 in 1940, a net
loss of about 240,000.”).
219 See KRIKORIAN, supra note 5, at 219 (“It’s true that raids at workplaces and else-
where will always be needed as an enforcement tool (like speed traps or random tax
audits in other contexts), because every illegal alien must understand that he or she
may be deported at any time.”).
220 See id. at 184 (“Immigrants don’t just cross a physical border when entering the
United States; they also cross a moral border, entering a nation that will not tolerate
the kind of premodern squalor and inhumanity that is the norm in much of the rest
of the world.”).
221 See, e.g., Shaun Raviv, If People Could Immigrate Anywhere, Would Poverty Be Elimi-
nated? THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 26, 2013), www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/
2013/04/if-people-could-immigrate-anywhere-would-poverty-be-eliminated/275332
(“[Although] the research on migration’s effects is far from complete, what [one
researcher] has found ‘suggests that the gains from reducing emigration restrictions
are likely to be enormous, measured in tens of trillions of dollars.’”).
222 See, e.g., Giovanni Peri, The Effect of Immigrants on U.S. Employment and Productivity,
FRBSF ECONOMIC LETTER 2010–26 (Aug. 30, 2010) (finding that “immigrants expand
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immigration opponents emphasize the short-term economic down-
side from illegal immigration for native-born low-wage and vulnera-
ble workers.223 These effects could be directly ameliorated through
increased enforcement of the employment rights of the most vul-
nerable members of our workforce.224
At the same time, increased enforcement of existing labor
standards would not “incentivize” illegal entry into the country, the
bugaboo of all proposed extensions of rights to the unauthorized.
As long-term trends have shown, macroeconomic factors over-
whelmingly determine year-by-year inflows.225 Indeed, one of the
benefits to employers of hiring the unauthorized is that such work-
ers may only dimly understand that the rights they enjoy in the
United States as workers are formally greater than what the laws of
the economy’s productive capacity by stimulating investment and promoting speciali-
zation,” which “produces efficiency gains and boosts income per worker,” while “evi-
dence is scant that immigrants diminish the employment opportunities of U.S.-born
workers.”).
223 See David Frum, Immigration Amnesty: The Path to Poverty, THE DAILY BEAST, (Mar.
22, 2013) (“The United States is already evolving into a society much harsher and less
hospitable for the less-skilled. Yet American elites seem determined to enlarge and
perpetuate a problem they already don’t know how to solve: how to create economic
opportunities for the least economically competitive half of the population.”), availa-
ble at www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/03/22/immigration-amnesty-the-path-to-
poverty.html.
224 See ZOLBERG, supra note 7, at 372 (“Although legalization and admission [in
1986] to permanent residence hardly transformed the immigrants’ social and eco-
nomic situation, the changes did afford them some tangible benefits. As of 1992,
while the jobs they held were still among the poorest paying, ‘the picture was not
uniformly bleak’; overall, ‘The advent of work authorization acted as a ‘union card,’
fostering widespread occupational mobility. Legalization also fostered widespread in-
vestments in education, training, and language skills, which-at least for Mexican men-
reaped substantial wage gains.’”).
225 See id. at 374, 375 (“Although employer sanctions had been touted ever since
the 1950s as a decisive deterrent to illegal immigration, most analysts concurred from
the outset that their effect was likely to be extremely limited, as the flow across the
border was largely shaped by economic conditions on both sides, and these powerful
‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors outweighed the costs that sanctions imposed on either em-
ployers or workers . . . entries in fact increased slightly after IRCA, and that those
ineligible for legalization had no intention of returning home to Mexico or Central
America but planned to increase the length of their stay in the United States so as to
minimize the frequency of risky crossings. It concluded that the effect of employer
sanctions was mainly to stimulate an expansion of the market in fake documents.”).
See also The Economist, The US-Mexico Border, Secure Enough, THE ECONOMIST (June 22,
2013), available at www.economist.com/news/united-states/21579828-spending-
billions-more-fences-and-drones-will-do-more-harm-good-secure-enough (“Economics
probably matters more than enforcement [as cause of decline in illegal entries to
U.S.]. America’s downturn cost many illegal migrants their jobs, just as opportunities
were blossoming back home in Mexico. In the past two years Mexico’s economy has
grown at a healthy 3.9% annually, creating jobs (albeit at much lower pay than in
America)).
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their home countries provided,226 or have strong reasons not to
care.227 Increased domestic enforcement of the working poor’s la-
bor rights may not do much to improve this level of knowledge
among people not already arrived in the nation, but it could
greatly help educate American employers and workers on the uni-
tary labor standards that will be applied to all who work here, even
those they consider outsiders.
CONCLUSION
As others have pointed out, arguments over whether a particu-
lar modern form of exploitation in the employment relationship is
an equivalent of slavery are largely insufficient to justify action.228
In contrast, an understanding of the reasons why the laws gov-
erning employment in this nation first arose in the wake of slav-
ery’s abolition helps lead to the conclusion that, if all who work are
equally worthy of a common minimum level of working conditions,
the government and third parties must undertake great effort to
maintain this level, against those who would seek to violate it. Such
effort is best directed towards the workers most likely to experience
226 See Alexander, supra note 81, at 382 (“Peripheral poultry workers may carry over
legal knowledge from their home countries, which may have less robust, or even less
robustly enforced, labor and employment rights regimes. They may have experience
with corruption in the justice systems of their home countries. Undocumented work-
ers in particular may have a deep mistrust of the U.S. government, believing that
interaction even with ‘friendly’ or ‘status-neutral’ agencies puts the worker at risk of
deportation. Even if workers are fully informed about their rights at work, they may
not know how to find a lawyer who speaks their language, will accept what they can
pay, and is willing to challenge the biggest, most powerful employer in town.”).
227 Id. at 387-88 (“Gleeson proposes that undocumented workers view themselves as
temporary, hard workers who do not complain. By tolerating substandard conditions,
peripheral workers strike a sort of bargain with society at large: their work ethic ‘sets
them apart from their native-born and documented counterparts, and ultimately justi-
fies their undocumented presence’ in the United States. Filing a lawsuit, complaining
to a government agency, or organizing into a union would upset the implicit ex-
change of labor for presence. In this way, immigration law writ large, and the state of
‘legally constructed subservience’ that it creates for undocumented workers, serves as
a powerful silencing force.”).
228 See Richard Delgado, Four Reservations on Civil Rights Reasoning by Analogy: The
Case of Latinos and Other Nonblack Groups, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1883, 1895 (2012)
(“Nonblack groups sometimes have been able to analogize their predicaments to ones
that Blacks suffer, just as the latter have sometimes been able to win relief for new
injuries by comparing them to ones that their slave ancestors suffered, but often the
effort has failed. Thus wartime internment, language discrimination, suppression of
Native American religions, and profiling based on presumed foreign appearance—
afflictions that do not stem from the enslavement of Blacks—have largely gone with-
out redress under American law, even though these injuries might appear compara-
ble to ones that lie at the heart of our system of racial remedies.”).
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such violations, at the bottom of income and in the shadows.229
The exploitation of these vulnerable workers is the very behavior
that our employment laws were first written to eliminate,230 and it
is accordingly the wrong to which the enforcers of those laws
should direct the most attention, as demanded by the heritage and
mandate of equal rights in our system of law.
229 See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218–19 (1982) (“This situation raises the
specter of a permanent caste of undocumented resident aliens, encouraged by some
to remain here as a source of cheap labor, but nevertheless denied the benefits that
our society makes available to citizens and lawful residents. The existence of such an
underclass presents most difficult problems for a Nation that prides itself on adher-
ence to principles of equality under law.”).
230 See WILKERSON, supra note 106, at 317 (“[W]hat was becoming clear was that,
north or south, wherever colored labor was introduced, a rivalrous sense of unease
and insecurity washed over the working-class people who were already there, an
unease that was economically not without merit but rose to near hysteria when race
and xenophobia were added to preexisting fears. The reality was that Jim Crow
filtered through the economy, north and south, and pressed down on poor and work-
ing-class people of all races. The southern caste system that held down the wages of
colored people also undercut the earning power of the whites around them, who
could not command higher pay as long as colored people were forced to accept sub-
sistence wages.”).
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